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Abstract
The doctrine of Molinism seeks to reconcile God’s sovereign predestination
with humanity’s free will by postulating a middle knowledge between God’s
natural knowledge and God’s free knowledge. God’s natural knowledge is taken
to exist prior to the divine decree and consists of all necessary truths. Through
this knowledge, God comprehends the possible so that God knows all ways in
which things could be. God’s free knowledge exists after the divine decree and
is thought of as the knowledge of contingent truths which God determines by
creating our world. The Molinist’s proposed middle knowledge slots in between
God’s natural and free knowledge, but before the divine decree.
Through God’s middle knowledge, God knows all contingent truths which
exist apart from God’s control. It is through God’s middle knowledge that
God comes to know how any free creature would act were they to be left free
in any specific set of circumstances. By combining natural knowledge and
middle knowledge, the Molinist believes that God is empowered to select and
create a feasible world in which all events which transpire do so because God
created a world in which they would.
Molinism postulating middle knowledge presents a potential problem: if God’s
middle knowledge exists prior to the divine decree it must take the form of
prevolitional and contingent subjunctive conditionals. If these subjunctive
conditionals, taking the form of propositional statements, exist in the meta-
physically heavyweight sense, then God would have to draw from outside of
the triune Godhead in order to complete middle knowledge. This would seem
to undercut God’s aseity by making God something other than wholly self-
existent and independent.
To address this issue, ontological commitment with respect to abstract objects
is investigated. Three broad approaches to abstract objects, namely realism,
arealism and anti-realism, are presented. In encountering the platonist’s realist
view of abstract objects, the Molinist must either defeat the Singular Term
argument or find a way to affirm that abstract objects do exist – but as entities
which depend upon God in some way or another. To this end, non-platonic
realist views and anti-realist views are investigated, both from the perspective
of their philosophical content and their theological suitability.
ii
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Opsomming
Die doktrine van Molinisme poog om God se soewereine uitverkiesing met
die mensdom se vrye wil te versoen deur die postuleer van ’n middel kennis
tussen God se natuurlike kennis en God se vrye kennis. God se natuurlike
kennis is aangeneem om voor die Goddelike dekreet te bestaan, en bestaan uit
alle nodige waarhede. Deur middel van hierdie kennis, het God begrip van
die moontlike, sodat God kennis van alle maniere waarop dinge kan wees het.
Die gratis kennis van God bestaan na die Goddelike dekreet, en is beskou as
die kennis van voorwaardelike waarhede wat God bepaal, deur die skep van
ons weˆreld. Die Molinis se voorgestelde middel kennis bestaan tussen God se
natuurlike en vrye kennis, maar voor die Goddelike dekreet.
Deur God se middel kennis, weet God van alle voorwaardelike waarhede wat
uitmekaar God se beheer bestaan. Dit is deur God se middel wete dat God kan
weet hoe ’n vrye wesens sou optree as hulle vry gelaat word in enige spesifieke
stel omstandighede. Deur die kombinasie van natuurlike kennis en middel
kennis, glo die Molinis dat God by magte is om ’n uitvoerbare weˆreld te kies
en te skep waarin al die gebeure is so omdat God’n weˆreld geskep waarin hulle
sou gebeur.
Molinisme se postuleer van middel kennis bied ’n potensie¨le probleem aan:
as God se middel kennis voor die Goddelike dekreet bestaan, moet dit die
vorm van voorwilsvermoe¨ en afhanklike subjunktief voorwaardelikes neem. As
hierdie subjunktief voorwaardelikes, wat die vorm van proposisionele state
neem, in die metafisies swaargewigte sin bestaan, sal God buite die Drie-enige
Godheid moet trek ten einde van die voltooi van middel kennis. Dit lyk of
God se Goddelike “aseity” ondermyn is deur God te verstaan as iets anders as
geheel selfbestaande en onafhanklik.
Om hierdie probleem aan te spreek, is ontologiese verbintenis met betrekking
tot abstrakte voorwerpe ondersoek. Drie bree¨ benaderings tot abstrakte voor-
werpe, naamlik realisme, arealism en anti-realisme, word aangebied. In bena-
dering tot die platoniese realistiese siening van abstrakte voorwerpe, moet die
Molinis o´f verslaan die enkelvoud termyn argument, of ’n manier vind om te
bevestig dat abstrakte voorwerpe bestaan - maar as entiteite wat afhanklik
van God op een of ander manier is. Vir hierdie doel, is nie-platoniese real-
iii
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istiese en nie-realistiese sienings ondersoek, beide vanuit die perspektief van
hul filosofiese inhoud en hul teologiese geskiktheid.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background and Rationale
The doctrine of Molinism seeks to reconcile God’s sovereign predestination
with humanity’s free will by postulating a middle knowledge between God’s
natural knowledge and free knowledge (Perszyk, 2013). First promulgated by
Luis de Molina during the 16th century, Molinism and middle knowledge has
recently been defended by a variety of theologians and philosophers such as
William Lane Craig (Craig, 1999), Alfred Freddoso (de Molina, 1988, p. 1-
81), Jonathan Kvanvig (Kvanvig, 1986), Thomas Flint (Flint, 1998) and Alvin
Plantinga (Plantinga, 1974b).
Molina’s work was inspired by the commonly held concern that God’s infallible
foreknowledge implies a denial of human freedom. Within Molinism, there are
three logical moments in the life of God which have been diagrammed as
follows:
Moment 1: God’s natural knowledge of everything that could be.
Moment 2: God’s middle knowledge of everything that would be.
Divine Decree
Moment 3: God’s free knowledge of everything that will happen in
the actual world (Campbell, 2006, p. 2).
Campbell explains this by saying “Prior to creation of the space-time con-
tinuum, God’s knowledge exists as timeless intuition which comprehends all
1
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truth” (Campbell, 2006, p. 2). The Molinist claims that God is atemporal,
at least at this stage, and as such is incapable of having successive temporal
experiences - thereby accounting for them being denoted as moments of divine
cognition (Campbell, 2006, p. 1-4).
The first of these moments is natural knowledge. Divine natural knowledge is
made up of all necessary truths – truths such as “no bachelor can be married”
or “2 + 2 = 4”. Through natural knowledge, God comprehends every possible
state of affairs such that God is able to comprehend a seemingly infinite variety
of possible worlds that could exist were God to will them into being (Campbell,
2006, p. 2). God’s natural knowledge is deemed natural because it is necessary
and essential, and would exist this way irrespective of whether the universe
were to exist or not (Perszyk, 2013, p. 755-756).
The third moment is the free knowledge of God which comprises of complete
knowledge of our current and contingent world. This knowledge is free because
it is determined by God’s free choice to actualise our world rather than a
different world, or simply not create at all (Campbell, 2006, p. 2-3). As a
result, this knowledge is both contingent and entirely under God’s control
(Perszyk, 2013, p. 755-756).
Where God’s natural knowledge exists prior to the divine decree, God’s free
knowledge exist only after God has determined this knowledge by creating
(Flint, 1998, p. 36-38).
The second moment is God’s middle knowledge, and it is through this know-
ledge that God knows what would have happened had God acted differently
(Perszyk, 2013, p. 755-756). Through God’s middle knowledge, the Molinist
claims that God has knowledge of contingent truths which God does not con-
trol. Because this knowledge exists prior to the divine decree, this knowledge
is said to exist prior to God’s act of volition – or prevolitionally – and as such
can inform the divine will (Flint, 1998, p.37-40).
This middle knowledge can be said to exist prevolitionally as contingent sub-
junctive conditionals which God does not control. By defining middle know-
eldge this way, the Molinist affirms that God’s middle knowledge is not de-
termined by God, that this middle knowledge exists prior to the divine decree
and that this middle knowledge can be characterised by means of subjunct-
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ive conditionals – that is, a conditional statement phrased in the subjunctive
mood1 (Flint, 1998, p. 38-41).
Perszyk elaborates on this by saying “More precisely, God has middle know-
ledge only if there are true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom that are con-
tingent but outside of his [sic] control” (Perszyk, 2013, p. 755). These coun-
terfactuals of creaturely freedom can be thought of as what any free creature
would freely choose to do under a specific set of circumstances if they were
given the opportunity (Perszyk, 2013, p. 756-757).
Understanding how God’s middle knowledge allows the Molinist to affirm both
divine providence and human freedom is somewhat complicated. Here is a
cursory overview of how this is said to occur: God’s natural knowledge gives
God knowledge of all necessary truths. By God’s natural knowledge, God
is able to comprehend all possibilities. As a result of this, God is able to
comprehend every way in which creation could possibly exist. These necessary
truths exist apart from God’s control and before the divine decree.
God’s middle knowledge also exists before the divine decree and apart from
God’s control, but is made up of contingent truths which are not determined
by God. Through God’s middle knowledge, God is able to know how any free
creature would behave were they left free in a specific set of circumstances at a
specific time. As a result of this, God is able to know how free creatures would
act were they to be created and placed in any possible set of circumstances
where they were left free.
In combining God’s natural knowledge and God’s middle knowledge, the Molin-
ist believes that God is given the possibility to survey possible worlds before
actualising our world (Beilby & Eddy, 2001, p. 120-123), having perfect know-
ledge of how free agents would act in any possible world in which they are left
free. Armed with this knowledge, God is then able to choose a world from
the range of worlds now feasible for God to create such that everything which
happens, happens that way because God’s will is for it to happen that way
whilst humans are afforded libertarian freedom.
1 To be phrased in the subjunctive mood is to be written in the form of “If... then...” For
example, “if I were you, then I would listen to these instructions.”
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1.2 Statement of the Problem
One objection to Molinism, raised by Travis Campbell, is that middle know-
ledge compromises the self-existence and self-sufficiency of God. Campbell ar-
gues that if God possesses middle knowledge, God’s knowledge is partially de-
termined by the free choices of creatures - something which Campbell argues in-
troduces passive potency into God’s knowledge (Campbell, 2006, p. 16). God’s
middle knowledge, then, is determined by the free choices of the creatures God
creates, making God “something less than absolutely independent” (Campbell,
2006, p. 16) and requiring God’s knowledge to be completed by drawing on
something outside of the triune Godhead, thereby making God less than wholly
self-existent (Campbell, 2006, p. 16).
The Molinist views God’s middle knowledge as being made up of a collection
of possible worlds which can be best thought of as a series of propositional
conjunctions which describe states of affairs (Craig, 2008, p. 183). These
propositional conjunctions operate as maximal descriptions of reality such that
God has perfect knowledge of all possible future worlds prior to any world being
actualised (Beilby & Eddy, 2001, p. 120-123). With these possible worlds
existing as propositional conjunctions prior to the divine decree, it stands to
reason that in order to respond to Campbell’s claim, the Molinist must consider
and formulate a view of abstract objects, and particularly propositional truths.
It should be made clear that this work will not endeavour to defend Molinist
in any way. This work will not look to criticise Molinism either2. Rather, this
work simply aims to consider and solve a problem for the Molinist: namely
the potential problem of the relationship between God’s middle knowledge and
abstract objects.
1.3 Research Questions
Primary Question:
2 Readers interested in criticism of Molinism are directed to the work of William Hasker
(Hasker, 1989). Hasker presents a version of the grounding objection – the objection which
asks if creatures do not yet exist when middle knowledge does, who actually determines
these contingent truths?
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(1) How can the Molinist preserve God’s aseity while affirming God’s middle
knowledge?
Secondary Questions:
(2) What is Molinism?
(3) What is Campbell’s objection to Molinism and middle knowledge?
(4) Which positions can be adopted when considering abstract objects?
(5) How does Quine’s Indispensability Argument withstand critique?
(6) Which positions regarding abstract objects are viable for the Molinist?
1.4 Contribution and Relevance
William Lane Craig once said that it will “be on the basis of practical applic-
ations — the theological fruitfulness or lack thereof — that Molinism [ulti-
mately] stands or falls” (Craig, 1995, p. 121). The relationship between ab-
stract objects, ontological commitment and God’s aseity seems to be exactly
that. Does a way exist for the Molinist to affirm both God’s aseity and God’s
middle knowledge? That is the motivating and very practical aspect of this
study. While the answer to this question may appear to be somewhat abstract
given it is located in the intricacies of metaphysics and ontological commit-
ment, the study as a whole is both practical and relevant to the viability of
Molinism.
1.5 Research Methodology
This research will be a non-empirical study (Mouton, 2001, p. 57) mainly fo-
cussed on a review of academic literature in Molinism, abstract objects and
metaphysics with regards to ontological commitment. The study will consist
of a brief description of Molinism and Molinism’s fundamental pillars: divine
providence and libertarian freedom. Divine aseity as understood by the Molin-
ist and the classical theist will also be defined before a more detailed view of
God’s knowledge as understood by the Molinist is examined.
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After seeing that God’s middle knowledge must exist in abstract for if it is
to exist prior to the divine decree, the study will move on to examining three
broad views of abstract objects: realism, arealism and anti-realism.
Realism, which affirms that abstract objects exist in the same way that you
or I exist (Craig, 2015, p.274-275), will be examined first. Next the arealist
position, which affirms that there exits no fact of the matter regarding the
existence of abstract objects (Craig, 2016, p. 206), will be considered. Finally,
options which affirm that abstract objects do not exist, called anti-realism
(Craig, 2016, p. 210), will be considered.
It is hoped that this study will provide a framework for considering the Molin-
ist’s options with respect to abstract objects, examining how each option im-
pacts the traditionally held understanding of God’s aseity.
1.6 An Introduction to the Primary
Literature and Concepts
1.6.1 An Introduction to Molinism
Chapter two of this work provides a framework for locating the
problem - namely within Molinism. It provides a background to
Molinism before exploring three fundamental aspects of Molinism:
divine providence, divine aseity and libertarian free will. Finally,
the way in which the Molinist views God’s knowledge is expounded
upon.
Molinism is named after Luis de Molina, a Jesuit who lived from 1535-1600.
Molinism is motivated by a commitment to two pillars, the first of which is
libertarian freedom (Perszyk, 2000, p. 11-33). Ken Perszyk minimally defines
libertarianism as “the thesis that freedom is incompatible with (causal) de-
terminism, plus the claim that at least some of our actions are free” (Perszyk,
2013, p. 755).
The second of these pillars is the commitment to a strong traditional account of
divine providence, entailing the thesis that everything which happens is either
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specifically intended or permitted by God (Perszyk, 2013, p. 755). On the
Molinist account, this can be seen to affirm that things exist in the currently
world the way in which they do because God chose to create the world in such
a way that they exist as they do.
A third aspect which is important for the argument of this thesis is God’s
aseity. God’s aseity is defined as being God’s self sufficience, God’s independ-
ence from creation and God’s necessity – that is to say, the fact that God
exists by necessity of God’s own nature (Grudem, 2000, p.161-162). In this
respect, the Molinist’s position draws on two sources: that of classical theism
and the foundation created by the Ontological Argument for God’s existence.
The Ontological Argument for God’s existence can be thought of as being
foundational because recent defenders and developers of Molinism have de-
veloped, defended and made use of the Ontological Argument when consider-
ing aspects of God such as God’s existence3 or God’s freedom4. Thomas Flint
makes the point that Molinist typically concurs with classical theism so that
where Molinism has nothing to say, the classical theistic position is likely to
provide a good foundational point for inquiry (Flint, 1998, p. 12).
The internal tension which exists between divine providence and human liber-
tarian freedom is clear for all to see, but the Molinist believes that this tension
can be dispelled by the promulgation of the doctrine of divine middle know-
ledge: the defining aspect of Molinism (Perszyk, 2013, p. 755-756). Middle
knowledge gets its name because it is said to stand between God’s natural
knowlege and free knowledge (Campbell, 2006, p. 3). The Molinist under-
stands God’s natural knowledge to be that which God knows to be necessary,
and through this, God knows what is possible. The Molinist understands God’s
free knowledge to be that which will be (Perszyk, 2013, p. 755-756). God’s
middle knowledge, then, “comprehends everything that would have happened
if God had been willing to decree its occurrence” (Campbell, 2006, p. 3).
3 William Lane Craig (Craig, 2008) has fervently argued for God’s existence whilst making
use of the Ontological Argument as formulated by Alvin Plantinga (Craig, 2008, p. 184-
189).
4 Thomas Flint (Flint, 1983) has defended the Ontological Argument as formulated by Alvin
Plantinga in relation to God’s free will.
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1.6.2 Possible Worlds and Campbell’s Objection
Chapter three of this work begins by examining how God’s middle
knowledge manifests itself through the concept of a possible world.
An objection to Molinist which is raised by Travis Campbell is then
introduced and defined, showing how Campbell believes middle
knowledge would undercut God’s aseity. Campbell’s objection is
different from, but related to, an older objection raised by Reginald
Garrigou-Lagrange, which is also explored before a logical limita-
tion regarding God’s omnipotence is provided in an attempt to
limit this objection’s impact on Molinism.
The Molinist affirms that it is through this middle knowledge that God is able
to know of a vast array of possible worlds, and from these possible worlds,
God chooses to actualise our current world (Craig, 2008, p. 182-185). Craig
describes these possible worlds as “maximal descriptions of reality, or a way
reality might be” (Craig, 2008, p. 183). These possible worlds are conjunctions
which are made up of every proposition or its contradictory within that world,
such that a maximal description of reality is rendered (Craig, 2008, p. 182-185).
It is at this point that we discover Campbell’s objection to middle knowledge.
Campbell claims that middle knowledge compromises God’s aseity by making
some aspect of God’s knowledge dependent on a source which exists apart from
the triune Godhead (Campbell, 2006, p. 16). This is because God does not
define the content of middle knowledge – rather God’s middle knowledge of
how free creatures will decide is defined by how the free creatures will choose.
By aseity, Campbell means to say that God “is pure actuality (there is no
potentiality [or passive potency] in his being); that he is wholly independent
and uncaused; that he is his act of existing; and so forth” (Campbell, 2006,
p. 16). This means that some amount of God’s knowledge is not determined by
God, thereby introducing “passive potency into God’s knowledge” (Campbell,
2006, p. 16). Furthermore, Campbell claims that middle knowledge makes
God something other than wholly self-contained, because God is required to
complete God’s knowledge by drawing on something outside of the Godhead
(Campbell, 2006, p.19).
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Campbell’s objection is distinct from, but influenced by, an objection raised by
Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange (Garrigou-Lagrange, 1934, p.557-558). Garrigou-
Lagrange was a Thomist who believed that if God was to be thought of as pure
actuality, this meant that all of God’s knowledge must be self-determined
(Craig, 1991, p.270). Thomas Flint and Alfred Freddoso affirm that God’s
knowledge being made up in this way is as a result of the logical limitation
of God choosing to create free creatures (Flint & Freddoso, 1983, p. 93-98).
Flint and Freddoso also affirm that a limitation of this type is similar to the
limitation which would be imposed upon God such that God is omnipotent
but unable to create a square circle, or something of that nature (Flint &
Freddoso, 1983, p. 95).
In responding to the objection with Flint and Freddoso’s logical argument,
Campbell’s claim that God’s middle knowledge must still be completed by
reaching outside of the triune Godhead could still exist if we think of propos-
itions, possible worlds and other abstract objects as existing.
1.6.3 Abstract Objects: Realism and the Singular
Term Argument
Chapter four begins by defining what an abstract object is before
outlining how one could, broadly speaking, approach abstract ob-
jects. This chapter then examines realist options with respect to
abstract objects. The platonist’s Singular Term argument is out-
lined, an argument which the platonist is motivated towards by the
view that mathematical objects are indispensable for the truth of
natural scientific theories.
With possible worlds, states of affairs and propositions being considered ab-
stract objects (Gould, 2011a, p.255-256), it stands to reason that the way the
Molinist must respond to Campbell’s objection is by formulating a defined
view of abstract objects. A number of ways to think about abstract objects
exist, and these can be broken into three broad categories: realism, arealism
and anti-realism (Craig, 2016, p. 203-206). Investigation begins with realism,
and more specifically, platonism.
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Platonism is the view that mind-independent abstract objects exist uncreated
(Craig, 2016, p. 201). Platonists affirm that we are committed to the existence
of abstract objects by many statements we consider to be true (Balaguer,
2016). Notably, the platonist claims that mathematics is indispensable for
many of our scientific theories (Craig, 2016, p. 210). To show this to be true,
platonist’s provide a Singular Term argument, which can be formulated as
such:
(1) If a simple sentence (i.e., a sentence of the form “a is F ”, or “a is R-
related to b”, or. . .) is literally true, then the objects that its singular
terms denote exist. (Likewise, if an existential sentence is literally true,
then there exist objects of the relevant kinds; e.g., if “There is an F ” is
true, then there exist some F s.)
(2) There are literally true simple sentences containing singular terms that
refer to things that could only be abstract objects. (Likewise, there are
literally true existential statements whose existential quantifiers range
over things that could only be abstract objects.) Therefore,
(3) Abstract objects exist (Balaguer, 2016).
This is the crux of the argument for platonism — the attempt to make abstract
objects indispensable. Ultimately, this argument is concerned with metaphys-
ics and specifically, ontological commitment. If we are committed to the ex-
istence of abstract objects referred to in propositional statements in order for
those statements to be true, then platonism may well be indispensable (Craig,
2013, p. 355-357).
After having considered this argument, three theistic realist positions are con-
sidered: platonic theism (van Inwagen, 2009, p. 4-11), absolute creationism
(Morris & Menzel, 1986, p. 353-362) and divine conceptualism (Welty, 2006).
Platonic Theism: Platonic theism is the position held by Peter van Inwagen.
Van Inwagen believes that the Singular Term argument is in fact true (van
Inwagen, 2015b, p. 289), thereby affirming that abstract objects are required
if we are to speak meaningfully and truthfully. At the same time, van Inwagen
recognises that by affirming that abstract objects exist uncreated and alongside
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God, God’s aseity as classically understood could be undercut (van Inwagen,
2009, p. 3-5). To get around this, van Inwagen proposes that abstract objects
are not able to be created by God and as a result of this, when the Nicene
Creed affirms that all things are created by God, the Nicene Creed is referring
only to things which can be created and not all things (van Inwagen, 2009,
p. 4-11).
Absolute Creationism: Promulgated by Thomas Morris and Christopher Men-
zel (Morris & Menzel, 1986, p.353-362), absolute creationism views abstract
objects as being created by God, with the claim that abstract objects exist
as entities within the mind of God being disputed. On this view, abstract
objects are said to depend upon God for their existence, having begun to exist
at some time (Morris & Menzel, 1986, p. 354). Unfortunately, this view suffers
from what Paul Gould categorises as a fatal flaw - that of the bootstrapping
objection (Gould, 2011a, p. 268-269).
Divine Conceptualism: Greg Welty’s (Welty, 2006) divine conceptualism views
abstract objects such as properties, possible worlds and propositions as existing
in the divine mind as God’s thoughts in some way (Craig, 2016, p. 209). As
such, these abstract objects exist dependent upon God and within God’s mind.
Welty takes propositions of this nature to describe the truths found in God’s
knowledge (Welty, 2004, p. 55-57) so that by affirming “3 is a prime number”
we would simply be describing a truth about the object 3 which exists in God’s
mind. A number of complications exist with adhering to divine conceptualism,
though this view remains a very viable option for the Molinist.
1.6.4 Abstract Objects: Arealism and Anti-Realism
Chapter five continues to explore ontological commitment, begin-
ning with arealism. This view is quickly dismissed before a survey
of some anti-realist positions commences. Anti-realist views con-
sidered include fictionalism, figuralism, free logic, Meinongianism,
neo-Meinongianism and neutral logic. Each of the aforementioned
views look to object to or undercut one or both of the premises of
the Singular Term argument.
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Further investigation begins with arealism. Arealism finds its roots in the
classical work of Rudolf Carnap (Carnap, 1956), and can be thought of as
the view that “there just is no fact of the matter concerning the existence of
putative abstract objects” (Craig, 2015, p. 274-275). This option seems to
be one which can be rejected out of hand by the Molinist, on account of the
fact that if all reality extra se is created by God, then a fact of the matter
regarding the existence of putative abstract objects most certainly does exist
(Craig, 2016, p. 206-207).
Anti-realism, as Craig prefers (Craig, 2015, p. 274-275), or Nominalism, as
Gould calls it (Gould, 2011a, p. 271-274), is the final broad option available
to the Molinist. On this view, abstract objects simply do not exist and as
a result the problem of God and abstract objects is avoided entirely (Gould,
2011b, p. 271). The Nominalist builds their argument off of the response to the
Indispensability Argument by showing that there are a number of instances
in which propositional statements can be truthfully descriptive without their
objects needing to exist (Gould, 2011b, p. 271-274).
The first anti-realist position considered is called fictionalism (Balaguer, 2015),
which treats abstract objects as useful fictions (Craig, 2012, p. 442). With
respect to the Singular Term argument, fictionalism accepts (1) but rejects
(2). The second anti-realist position is called figuralism (Yablo, 2000). This
view argues we ought to treat discourse regarding abstract objects in the same
way we treat figures of speech like “I have butterflies in my stomach” or “it’s
raining cats and dogs!” (Craig, 2016, p. 211-212).
Free logic is the anti-realist position which affirms that singular terms in simple
sentences need not make reference at all (Lambert, 2001, p.258). On this
view, the principles of Existential Generalisation and Universal Instantiation
are reformulated so as to reduce ontological commitment (Craig, 2012, p. 446).
On this view, ontological commitment with respect to singular terms in simple
sentences is removed, but ontological commitment in existential quantification
remains (Craig, 2012, p. 445).
The anti-realist positions of Meinongianism (Meinong, 1960), neo-Meinongianism
(Routley, 1979) and neutral logic (Azzouni, 2004) are considered last. Meinong
believed that a distinction could be made between beings which exist and be-
ings which subsist, with abstract objects which have being subsisting (van In-
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wagen, 2008, p.38-39). Neo-Meinonganism is the anti-realist view which affirms
that one can make reference by means of singular terms in simple sentences to
non-existent abstract objects (Craig, 2015, p. 275-276). Finally, neutral logic
is the view which criticises classical logic’s existence assumption when quan-
tifying over objects (Reicher, 2015). The neutral logician would affirm that
it is completely reasonable to quantify without making any ontological com-
mitment, thereby allowing one to quantify over numbers, for example, without
being committed to grounding those objects in reality in any way (Craig, 2012,
p. 447).
The Molinist need not select any one of these specific options in order to show
that the realist’s argument is flawed. Rather, the Molinist must simply show
that these arguments are viable in order to show that the anti-realist position
as a whole is viable (Craig, 2012, p. 451).
1.6.5 Conclusion
The final chapter provides concluding thoughts regarding the po-
sition the Molinist finds themselves in. By showing that options
apart from platonism, and indeed realism, exist the Molinist is well
within their rights to affirm a view which rejects the ontological
commitment the platonist affirms. In doing this, the Molinist is
free to deny the existence of abstract objects, thereby sidestepping
Campbell’s objection and preserving God’s aseity.
A variety of objections to the platonist’s Singular Term argument are pointed
out in this work, with a number of views being shown to be viable options for
the Molinist. Furthermore, even if the Molinst were to be convinced by the
Singular Term argument, this does nothing to affirm the view that abstract
objects exist uncreated. The Molinist may easily select one of the realist
options open to the theist, thereby seeing abstract objects as created by and
dependent upon God.
As long as the Molinist does not adhere to the view that abstract objects
exist uncreated and alongside God eternally, the Molinist is able to sidestep
Campbell’s objection to middle knowledge. Middle knowledge exist prior to
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the divine decree, and as a result, contingent, prevolitional subjunctive con-
ditionals must take the form of abstract objects. If abstract objects do not
exist, or if they exist as created entities which are dependent upon God, God’s
knowledge remains wholly self-contained and as a result God can continue to
be seen as being independent, self-sufficient, wholly self-existent and necessary.
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Chapter 2
An Introduction to Molinism
2.1 Introduction
Luis de Molina was a Spanish counter-reforming Jesuit who lived from 1535-
1600. Molina became involved in debates surrounding the doctrine of divine
providence and set forth his views on the topic in his work titled Liberi Ar-
bitrii cum Gratiae Donis, Divina Praescientia, Providentia, Praedestinatione
et Reprobatione Concordia — colloquially referred to as the Concordia (Flint,
1998, p. 2). Initially the work was heavily criticised by Molina’s contemporar-
ies before drifting into the background of the divine providence-philosophical
landscape. In his attempt to respond to the problem of evil, Alvin Plantinga
unwittingly promulgated the doctrine of Molinism and middle knowledge in
the mid 1970s and in doing so, brought the debate to the attention of English-
speaking philosophers1 (Plantinga, 1974a, p. 34-44).
By way of reiteration, it should be noted that this work is primarily focused on
the philosophical content of Molina’s work rather than the philosophical his-
tory of his work. To that end, this chapter will review the doctrine of Molinism
by considering and defining some of the fundamental aspects of the doctrine,
1 Henceforth I shall use the term Molinist to refer to a person who adheres with the view
of Molinism as promulgated by contemporary Molinists like Alvin Plantinga (Plantinga,
1974b), Thomas Flint (Flint, 1998), William Lane Craig (Craig, 1999), Alfred Freddoso
(de Molina, 1988, p. 1-81) or Thomas Kvanvig (Kvanvig, 1986).
15
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beginning with the first of the pillars of the doctrine: divine providence (Per-
szyk, 2013, p. 755).
2.2 Divine Providence
Understanding Molinism begins by establishing some number of truth claims
regarding divine attributes of God. Molinists view God as the creator of
all things (Flint, 1998, p. 37) and believe God is omnipotent2, omniscient3
and omnibenevolent4 (Flint, 1998, p. 12). This section shows that while these
attributes may not be universally accepted as ascribed to God, it is not outside
of Christian tradition to do so.
Molinism affirms many of the attributes of God which the classical theist
would, viewing God as the creator of all things (Flint, 1998, p. 37) and adhering
to the notion that divine providence is the natural outworking of God’s perfect
knowledge, love and power. Speaking of the matter, Thomas Flint says:
Being omniscient, God has complete and detailed knowledge of
his world — its history, its current state, and its future. Being
omnipotent, God has complete and specific control over that world,
a world which has developed and will continue to evolve in accord
with his sovereign and never-failing will. Being omnibenevolent,
God has used his knowledge and power to fashion and execute a
plan for his world that manifests his own moral perfection and the
inexhaustible love he bears for his creation (Flint, 1998, p. 12).
The Molinist believes God has complete knowledge of our universe. God knows
all things about our past, present and future. The Molinist also asserts that
2 I take God’s omnipotence to be God’s capacity to unfailingly achieve God’s divine will – a
view affirmed by Flint (Flint, 1998, p. 12) and Wayne Grudem (Grudem, 2000, p. 216-218).
3 I take God’s omniscience to be God’s complete and perfect knowledge of all things which
are possible, the Godhead and the actual world – a view also affirmed by Wayne Grudem
(Grudem, 2000, p. 190-193).
4 I take God’s omnibenevolence to mean that God is perfectly good (Grudem, 2000, p. 197-
200) and that God is the standard for moral perfection (Flint, 1998, p. 12).
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God controls our universe and has done so in a specific and deliberate way
from the beginning of our universe and will continue to do so as we progress
through time.
Furthermore, the Molinist holds that God is the measure of moral perfection,
perfectly embodies love, and outwardly works, or manifests, this this love
through all activity. In viewing God this way, the Molinist would affirm that
all of God’s activity is perfectly good, expressing perfect love and never failing
to fulfil the divine will.
Additionally, the Molinist view of divine providence holds that everything
which happens in this world is either specifically ordained or permitted by
God5 (Perszyk, 2013, p. 755). Nothing which happens does so without God’s
knowledge or without God’s permission – every minute detail of our world falls
under the purview of God.
It is important to note that the Molinist holds that divine providence extends
beyond a plan for each individual to literally everything in our world — an-
imals, families, people groups, nations etc (Flint, 1998, p. 12-22). This is
important to note because the Molinist holds that God’s knowledge of and
interaction with creation is not limited to any subset of reality. The divine
will is not concerned only with humans but rather will all of creation.
Very little, if anything, in Christianity could be considered to be unequivocally
accepted as a foundational belief6. Divine providence is no exception (Flint,
1998, p. 4-6). Nevertheless, the view that God has certain and complete fore-
knowledge while also exercising strong and specific sovereignty7 over our world
5 Grudem defines God’s providence as such “God is continually involved with all created
things in such a way that he (1) keeps them existing and maintaining the properties with
which he created them; (2) cooperates with created things in every action, directing their
distinctive properties to cause them to act as they do; and (3) directs them to fulfil his
purposes” (Grudem, 2000, p. 315). The Molinist would concur with (1) and (3), but differs
on (2) as will be seen.
6 By this I mean to say that very little within Christianity is unanimously agreed upon.
7 I take God’s sovereignty to be the way in which God uses the property of omnipotence
to interact with and rule over creation such that God ensures the divine will is achieved
(Grudem, 2000, p. 217).
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is in no way controversial (Flint, 1998, p. 12-15). In fact, this view is more
likely to be considered a traditional view of God.
Consider, for example, this excerpt from the Westminster Confession of Faith
of 1647:
God, the great Creator of all things, doth uphold, direct, dispose,
and govern all creatures, actions and things, from the greatest even
to the least, by his most wise and holy providence, according to his
infallible foreknowledge, and the free and immutable counsel of his
own will, to the praise of the glory of his wisdom, power, justice,
goodness, and mercy (Williamson, 1964, p. 46).
The Westminster Confession concurs with the Molinist in viewing God as the
creator of all things, as well as saying that God’s knowledge is unfaltering,
knowing all things in our universe — past, present and future. God’s in-
volvement in all aspects of our universe’s progress up until this point as well
as going forwards is similarly agreed upon, with God’s scope of involvement
being unrestricted. Attributes thought of as being God’s such as divine good-
ness, justice and power are also shared by the Westminster Confession and the
Molinist (Flint, 1998, p. 15).
Thus, the Molinist concurs with the Westminster Confession in saying that
God is concerned with all of reality, knowing of and sovereignly ruling over
creation whilst directing all things by the perfectly good divine will.
The First Vatican Council also shares these views of God:
By his providence God protects and governs all things which he
has made, “reaching mightily from one end of the earth to the
other, and ordering all things well” [Wisdom 8:1]. For “all are
open and laid bare to his eyes” [Hebrews 4:13], even those things
which are yet to come into existence through the free action of
creatures (FirstVaticanCouncil, 1994, p. 80).
The Molinist concurs with the First Vatican Council in affirming that God’s
knowledge is comprehensive and complete. Similarly, the First Vatican Council
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and the Molinist agree when saying that God’s knowledge is neither limited
to ongoing events nor that which has transpired. God’s knowledge extends to
the future – knowing even that which is in no way naturally determined.
John Calvin shared a similar view of God’s sovereignty, expressing his view in
1536 when he said:
After learning that there is a Creator, [faith] must forthwith infer
that he is also a Governor and Preserver, and that, not by pro-
ducing a kind of general motion in the machine of the globe as
well as in each of its parts, but by a special Providence sustaining,
cherishing, superintending, all the things which he has made, to
the very minutest, even to a sparrow (Calvin, 2005, p. 180-181).
Calvin and the Molinist agree that all of reality can be thought of as within
God’s providence – from the greatest to the smallest. The things which fall
under God’s providence can be thought of as being directly a part of the divine
will and as such for a part of God’s omniscience and are sustained by God’s
omnipotence.
Furthermore, Calvin concurs that God, as creator, exercises power in such a
way that all things are worked deliberately and specifically such that “nothing
happens but what he has knowingly and willingly decreed” (Calvin, 2005,
p. 183).
This view of divine providence is similarly formulated and shared by Thomas
Aquinas, who held that God knows the truth value of future events which are
not physically determined by present events8 (Aquinas, 1948). In expressing
this, Aquinas affirms that God’s knowledge of future events extends beyond
that which is necessitated by natural events or the current natural state of our
world. Aquinas and the Molinist agree that God’s knowledge is made up of
both the entirety of the natural state of our world as well as the free decisions
which have yet to be made by free agents.
8 Aquinas’ views on the matter can be found in Summa Theologica, Ia, Q. 14, Art. 13
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Aquinas also agrees with the aforementioned views of God’s sovereignty, stat-
ing as much in his work Summa Theologiae9 (Aquinas, 1948).
These citations are by no means a proof of anything, though they do serve
as evidence of the fact that the Molinist view of God’s foreknowledge and
sovereignty is both well founded and widely accepted throughout the classical
Christian world view. In affirming God’s foreknowledge and sovereignty in this
way, the Molinist’s claim cannot be thought of being radical or outside of the
classical theistic bounds.
2.3 Divine Aseity
The word aseity is derived from the Latin words a se which can be directly
translated as “from himself” (Grudem, 2000, p. 161). Ascribed to God, this
attribute is termed divine aseity and is interpreted to mean that God exist
independently of all creation, that God is self-sufficient, that God exists ne-
cessarily and that God exists by virtue of God’s own nature (Grudem, 2000,
p. 161-162).
A great deal of work pouring over and interpreting biblical scripture has been
done to show that this attribute, as detailed above, ought to be ascribed to
God. Having said that, examining that material is not the task of this work10.
Nevertheless, this work does contend that preserving God’s aseity as outlined
is a priority for the Molinist. There are two reasons this is asserted.
First, viewing God as a self-sufficient, necessary and therefore an uncreated
being is something which has been affirmed as being true on many occasions
in Christian history. Perhaps the best example of this can be found in the
Nicene Creed11:
9 Aquinas’ views on God’s sovereignty can be found in Summa Theologica, Ia, Q. 22, Art. 2
10Craig has done a significant amount of work in this regard recently, looking to show that
God exists uncreated and that all creation which exist extra se should be considered as
having been created by God (Craig, 2016, p. 202-205).
11Here I have quoted as segment of the Nicene Creed as revised at Constantinople in A.D.
381.
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I believe in one God, the Father, Almighty, Maker of heaven and
earth and of all things visible and invisibe;
And in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, be-
gotten of the Father before all worlds, God of God, Light of Light,
very God of very God, begotten, not made, being of one substance
with the Father; by whom all things were made (Grudem, 2000,
p. 1169).
God is affirmed here as being uncreated and existing prior to creation of the
world12. A similar view is promulgated by the Westminster Confession of Faith
of 1647:
God hath all life, glory, goodness, blessedness, in and of himself;
and is alone in and unto himself all-sufficient, not standing in need
of any creatures which he hath made, not deriving any glory from
them, but only manifesting his own glory, in, by, unto, and upon
them (Williamson, 1964, p. 23).
Further to seeing God as the creator of all things (Williamson, 1964, p. 46),
The Westminster Confession of Faith affirms that God is self-sufficient and
relies in no way on creation (Williamson, 1964, p. 23).
It seems reasonable to say that the classical theist would affirm that God exists
as a self-sufficient being, independent of creation13. As Flint points out, the
Molinist largely aligns themselves with the classical theistic position and as a
result it would not be unreasonable to affirm that God is seen by the Molinist
as existing a se (Flint, 1998, p. 4-5).
A second reason to think that the Molinist wants to affirm God’s aseity is that
academics who have developed Molinism in the recent past have also affirmed
12God is also affirmed here as being the creator of all things which exist apart from God,
that is extra se (Craig, 2016, p. 205).
13Further study regarding what the Nicene church fathers likely held to be true has been done
by Harry Austryn Wolfson, who concluded that the church fathers held that God alone
is uncreated, nothing is co-eternal with God, and that eternality implies deity (Wolfson,
1970, p. 414).
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the truth of the ontological argument for God’s existence14. Alvin Plantinga,
the person who reignited the discussion regarding Molinism and middle know-
ledge, reformulated the Ontological Argument when he wrote his book The
Nature of Necessity (Plantinga, 1974b). A full exposition of Platinga’s work
would be impossible to include here, though a brief examination is called for.
Plantinga’s argument15 looks like this:
(i) It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
(ii) If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally
great being exists in some possible world.
(iii) If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists
in every possible world.
(iv) If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists
in the actual world.
(v) If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally
great being exists.
(vi) Therefore, a maximally great being exists (Craig, 2008, p.184-185).
An immense amount could be, and indeed has been, said about this argu-
ment16. What Plantinga affirms from this argument is that God is a being who
is maximally excellent in all possible ways. Plantinga takes this to require that
14 For example, Flint has defended the Ontological Argument as formulated by Alvin
Plantinga in relation to God’s free will (Flint, 1983), while William Lane Craig has fer-
vently argued for God’s existence whilst making use of the Ontological Argument for God’s
existence (Craig, 2008, p. 184-189)
15 Plantinga’s formulation of the argument is particularly excellent because (ii) - (v) are
relatively uncontroversial. If we can affirm (i), the rest of the argument follows without
much objection.
16Interested readers are referred to Plantinga’s work on the matter (Plantinga, 1974b) and
(Plantinga, 1974a)
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God exhibit a number of great-making properties such as omniscience, omni-
potence and moral perfection17 (Craig, 2008, p. 184). Additionally, Plantinga
extrapolates from this argument that a maximally excellent being exists ne-
cessarily (Plantinga, 1974a, p. 104-106) and therefore God exists necessarily.
For an object or entity to exist necessarily is to exist because it is the nature
of that object or entity to exist, therefore for God to exist necessarily is for
God to exist by God’s nature (Gould, 2011a, p. 256).
A number of further things could be said to be true if the Ontological Argument
is true. If any attribute can be thought of as being great making, God would
have to be maximally excellent with respect to that attribute. For example, if
it were better to be morally good, then God would have to be the maximally
great being with respect to morality. Similarly, if it were the case that it were
better to have knowledge, then it would have to be the case that God would
be maximally great with respect to knowledge.
Furthermore, if God exists as a maximally great being by virtue of God’s
nature, then it follows that the actual world can in no way have influenced
God’s greatness. This is because God’s nature dictates God’s maximal great-
ness, not the actual world. Had the actual world been different, God’s maximal
greatness would not have been influenced. In addition, the Ontological Argu-
ment claims that God exists as maximally great in all possible worlds, but only
our world is actual. Thus, we can say that God’s maximal greatness cannot
have been determined by the actual world – and as such God can be thought
of as existing independently of creation.
Thus, if the Molinist is to follow in the footsteps of those who have recently
developed the position whilst aligning themselves with the classical theist,
the Molinist must affirm that God exists independently of creation, that God
exists necessarily, that God exists by God’s nature and that God exists self-
sufficiently. The Molinist must then affirm God’s aseity.
17I have previously referred to this as omnibenevolence.
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2.4 Libertarian Freedom
Another truth claim foundational to Molinist position is that some form of
libertarian freedom is true for some or all of the creatures created by God.
That is to say, some or all of the creatures created by God are afforded the
opportunity to make some number of decisions which are self-determined. No
minimum number of self-determined actions is set in this claim, just that free
agents must be left to make at least one free choice in order to be considered
both free and self determining.
Ken Perszyk minimally defines libertarian freedom as “the thesis that freedom
is incompatible with (causal) determinism, plus the claim that at least some
number of our actions are free” (Perszyk, 2013, p. 755). To consider this
assertion in more detail, we should follow Thomas Flint’s work on the matter
and consider the following three propositional statements:
(1) Some human actions are free.
(2) All human actions are ultimately causally determined by events not un-
der the causal control of their agents.
(3) It is not possible that a free human action be ultimately causally de-
termined by events not under the causal control of its agent (Flint, 1998,
p. 22-24)
Flint argues that (1) is relatively easily accepted on account of the fact that it
seems to correspond with our experience of life. That is to say, we act in day
to day life in a way which we seem to have chosen, when a different alternative
seems to have been open to us. For example, I chose to engage in postgraduate
studies when it at least seems as if I could have refrained from doing so. Thus,
I take it that I was free to engage in postgraduate studies when I could have
refrained from doing so.
This notion could be expanded in various ways - such as by stipulating that
the notions of freedom and actions are intrinsically linked, or by proposing
that at least some number of human actions are always free — but Flint takes
the relatively conservative (1) to be sufficient (Flint, 1998, p. 23).
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By (2), Flint means the actions of all agents can always be found to exist as a
result of a cause which was not controlled by the agent committing the action.
This can be rephrased to say All agents act as a result of causes which exist
beyond their control.
A common argument in favour of (2) is as follows: Actions by humans are
not random, but rather are caused by the reasons any given agent has acted
— namely that agent’s beliefs, desires and so on. Beliefs and desires are not
things which spontaneously begin to exist in their current form within an agent
— they must be caused too. As such, the causal chain which has necessitated
any given action by an agent cannot be found to have begun within the agent.
Rather, the origin of the causal chain must exist outside of the agent, either
in other agents or external events — both of which the original agent has no
control over (Flint, 1998, p. 22-23). On (2), all humans lack free will and all
human actions are causally determined18 by external sources and not the agent
in question.
In the past many expanded (2) to be applicable to any given event which could
be located in time19. This thesis, however, has been marginalised by recent
developments in microphysics and quantum physics where theories related to
quantum events being indeterminate have caused a decline in the number of
proponents of (2) (Flint, 1998, p. 22-24).
Finally, Flint takes (3) to be quite plausible. By (3), Flint means to say free
actions must be caused by the agent committing those free actions or It is
impossible for a free agent’s free actions to be caused by anything other than
the free agent in question.
Flint sums this up by saying:
For my act to be free, one is inclined to think, it has to be my
action, not someone else’s. Self-determination lies at the very
18 The term causal determination should be understood as such: Event A can be said to
causally determines a separate event B if it would be logically impossible for A to obtain
and B not to obtain, given the laws of nature (Flint, 1998, p. 22).
19By this I mean to say, events located in time which are not necessarily related to an agent.
Laws of nature, for example.
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heart of freedom; to say that an act of mine was free, but was
ultimately determined by someone or something other than me,
someone or something whose determining activity was utterly bey-
ond my power to control, is to speak nonsense (Flint, 1998, p. 23).
This point is particularly important to understand. The root of freedom can
be found in self-determination. Any free agent must have the capacity to self-
determine by virtue of being free20. To assert that a free agent’s free action
was determined by something other than the agent is, as Flint says, “to speak
nonsense” (Flint, 1998, p. 23). This does not mean that free agents cannot
have some of their actions determined. What it does mean is that all of the
free actions which free agents take find their cause in the agent in question.
These three propositional statements each possess individual merit but all
three together are incoherent — the conjunction of any two precludes the
third. This leaves us with three distinct positions to consider.
First, by rejecting (1) and retaining (2) and (3) we are left concluding that no
human actions are free because all are determined. This view is called hard
determinism21 (van Inwagen, 1975, p. 185-187).
Second, by rejecting (2) and accepting (1) and (3), we are saying that some
human actions have no determining source outside of the causal agent them-
selves. Thus, some human actions are free. This view is called libertarianism
(Vallentyne, 2011).
Finally, we could reject (3) and be left with (1) and (2), leaving us to reject the
incompatibility of determinism and freedom and affirm the concept of some
human actions being free while all human actions are in some way determined.
This view is called compatibilism (van Inwagen, 1985, p. 349-350; Flint, 1998,
p. 22-24).
20This does not mean that all actions by free agents must be free, just that the free actions
of free agents must find their causal root within the agent in question.
21Peter van Inwagen defines determinism as “the thesis that the past and the laws of nature
together determine a unique future, that only one future is consistent with the past and
the laws of nature” (van Inwagen, 1989, p. 400).
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While all three of the aforementioned positions may be viable for the theist22,
Molinism subscribes to libertarianism. The Molinist would assert that (1) —
some number of our actions are free - and (3) — free human actions are caused
by the agent in question - are true. As one would expect, libertarianism houses
within itself a continuum of perspectives. Some, like Peter van Inwagen, believe
that free actions exist but are rare (van Inwagen, 1989, p. 404) while others
believe that almost all human actions are free. A specific or more detailed view
on this matter is not necessary in order to assert or understand the Molinist
position.
Having expanded on how the Molinist views both God’s sovereign interac-
tion with creation and libertarian freedom, we can clearly see that a conflict
between these two issues exists. How could it be possible that God has any
control over the actions of a free agent while those actions remain free? That
is to say, how is it possible to assert that God is in control of all things in our
world while simultaneously saying that at least some of the actions taken by
agents are neither caused by God nor determined by the circumstances sur-
rounding that agent? Does it not follow to say that by God allowing agents
freedom, God is not in control of their actions?
This conflict is one which Molina had no qualm recognising, and the solution
to this problem is the defining aspect of the doctrine of Molinism.
2.5 God’s Knowledge
In this section, God’s knowledge will be categorised and the categories will be
related to one another. The concept of a possible world will be encountered
and expanded upon in chapter three.
Molina stated clearly in Disputation 52, section 9 that he believed the an-
swer to the divine sovereignty-human freedom conundrum could be found in
understanding God’s knowledge:
22Admittedly, hard determinism is rather challenging for the Christian to accept. On this
view, agents would be determined to act in certain ways whilst simultaneously being held
responsible for their actions (Flint, 1998, p. 24-27).
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Unless we want to wander about precariously in reconciling our
freedom of choice and the contingency of things with divine fore-
knowledge, it is necessary for us to distinguish three types of know-
ledge in God (de Molina, 1988, p.168).
To consider God’s types of knowledge, it is important to understand the rela-
tionship between God’s foreknowledge23 and the divine decree.
It seems clear that God’s foreknowledge must, in some way, be related to and
follow from God’s sovereign decisions. God’s knowledge of what will happen
must follow from what God chooses to do24. Flint says of the relationship
between God’s will and God’s knowledge:
If it were not so dependent — if his decisions made no difference
to his foreknowledge — then the notion of God’s being in control
of his world would clearly be a sham (Flint, 1998, p. 36).
God’s foreknowledge, then, is at least partially determined by how God decides
to act.
Let us consider God’s foreknowledge in relation to God’s divine decree —
sometimes referred to as God’s creative act of will (Campbell, 2006, p. 2-3).
In choosing to create, God orders a specific number of creatures and puts
them in a specific set of circumstances which thus leads to an innumerable
number of successive temporal events and acts. Alvin Plantinga calls this
God’s complete creative action and takes it to mean God’s complete act of
causing25 (Plantinga, 1974b, p. 173-181). Further, the Molinist takes the divine
decree to be a free act, or an act volition (Flint, 1998, p. 37-38).
23 Flint takes God’s foreknowledge to be God’s certain knowledge of what will happen in
our future (Flint, 1998, p. 12).
24That is to say, if God chooses to do something, God will know what will happen in the
future on account of God having decided upon a course of action.
25God’s complete creative action is to include all acts of causation for which God is respons-
ible. Phrased this way, the Molinist is not required to affirm whether God causes all reality
at any one time, or if God engages in ongoing creative action. Irrespective of whether God
engages in an A-Theory of time or a B-Theory of time styled creative act, this creation
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It seems clear that a significant amount of interplay between God’s will and
God’s foreknowledge must exist such that a great deal of what God knows will
occur is as a result of the divine will for that to occur. For example, suppose
God chose to create a person at time t. In doing so, God knows that person
will come to be at time t. Thus, “it is only subsequent to his performing his
creative act of will that God has foreknowledge as to how things will actually
be” (Flint, 1998, p. 37).
God’s foreknowledge of how things will actually be, then, would exist after
God’s free divine decree and therefore could not have guided the complete
creative action. That is to say, God’s creative act of will determines what God
foreknows will occur in the future. That is not to say that God’s complete
creative action is entirely uninformed. Rather, the divine decree would have
been informed by the knowledge God possessed prior to the divine decree —
knowledge made up of necessary truths (Campbell, 2006, p. 2).
These necessary truths — truths which exist apart from any decision — would
have to exist as prevolitional knowledge26 (Flint 1998:36-38). These prevo-
litional, necessary truths fall into the category of God’s natural knowledge
because they exist in the mind of the omniscient God “naturally and essen-
tially” (Campbell, 2006, p. 2). Thus we can think of God’s free choice to create
as God’s act of volition, with God’s natural knowledge existing logically prior
to this27 (Flint, 1998, p. 37-38).
Expanding on the content of natural knowledge, Travis Campbell says:
The divine natural knowledge comprehends every possible state-of-
affairs that could obtain. In short, the natural knowledge of God
comprehends the merely possible (Campbell, 2006, p. 2).
would have a beginning point and would be both designed and decided upon logically prior
to that beginning point. Readers interested in temporal becoming and theories of time are
directed to Craig’s book Time and Eternity (Craig, 2001).
26God has yet to take any creative action at this stage, so they must exist prevolitionally
27Or prevolitionally.
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Therefore, God’s natural knowledge also provides God with the knowledge of
which worlds are possible28.
As a result of the divine decree, God’s knowledge transitions from knowing
what is possible to knowing what is actual. This new knowledge informs God
of which contingent29 truths are now actual, thereby informing God of which
possible truths are false30 (Flint, 1998, p. 38). This knowledge is God’s postvo-
litional knowledge and is made up of contingent truths which God has freely
determined by the divine decree. Because this knowledge is freely determined,
it is called God’s free knowledge (Campbell, 2006, p. 2).
In summary, the Molinist takes God’s decree to be both God’s act of volition
and God’s complete creative act. God’s complete creative act informs God’s
knowledge of what will happen. Prior to the divine decree, God possess nat-
ural knowledge – knowledge which is made up all necessary truths by which
God is able to comprehend all possibilities. After God’s divine decree, God’s
knowledge transitions from what is possible to what is actual. Because this
happens as a result of God’s free and complete act of creation God freely
determines that which is actual. This is called God’s free knowledge.
The aforementioned types of knowledge don’t yet account for how God acts
sovereignly. How does God have foreknowledge of or control over contingent
events undetermined by God31? Flint gets at the heart of the matter when he
asks:
How does it assure him [God] knowledge or sovereignty with re-
spect to those events involving non-divine beings that are not only
28More will be discussed regarding the concept of possible worlds in the next chapter, for
now we will continue to explore the types of God’s knowledge.
29By contingent I mean that a statement is true in some possible worlds but not all possible
worlds. In doing so, I concur with Paul Gould (Gould, 2014, p. 104), Plantinga (Plantinga,
1974b), William Lane Craig (Craig, 2008) and other philosophers.
30Not all possibilities would necessarily be actual in our world, thus some possible states of
affairs would not be actual, and therefore they would be false.
31By this I mean the actions of free agents. These actions cannot be caused by God as they
must find their cause within the free agent (Flint, 1998, p. 22-24).
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. AN INTRODUCTION TO MOLINISM 31
logically contingent, but causally contingent as well — that is, with
respect to events that are not naturally necessary? (Flint, 1998,
p. 38).
The Molinist view is that God’s free knowledge and providence can only be
present and exercised if God has complete knowledge of how free creatures will
behave in any set of non-determining circumstances prior to the divine decree
(Flint, 1998, p. 40).
That is to say, God can only have full and unfaltering knowledge of our present
world whilst also possessing complete divine providence over our world if God
has knowledge of how free creatures will behave when afforded freedom to
choose in any specific set of circumstances.
This may be best demonstrated by means of an example. Suppose a free agent,
we’ll call this agent Maurice, could be placed in a set of circumstances where
he is free to purchase a board game at time f in the future. On account of the
fact that Maurice is a free agent, he has the power to choose whether he will
or will not purchase the board game at time f.
It follows from this that there are two sets of possible worlds in which all the
circumstances regarding Maurice’s board gaming buying quandary are exactly
the same, but the outcome would be different — either Maurice purchases
the board game or he does not. Let’s call the set of worlds where Maurice
purchases the board game the P -worlds and the worlds in which he does not
the R-worlds.
We now have a scenario where Maurice, as a free agent, is free with respect
to purchasing a board game at time f in a specific set of circumstances. If
Maurice chooses to purchase the board game, Maurice can be thought of as
existing in a P -world. Simultaneously, if Maurice freely refrains from buying
the board game, Maurice would exist in an R-world.
Through God’s natural knowledge, God would know that both P -worlds and
R-worlds are possible32, but God would have no way of knowing what the out-
32 For the sake of this argument, we will assume that both P -worlds and R-worlds are
possible.
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come of Maurice’s decision would be if the set of circumstances at time f were
to be actualised. That is to say, armed with natural knowledge, God would
know that P -worlds and R-worlds are possible, but not have knowledge of how
any free creature would behave when left free in a specific set of circumstances
within those worlds – including Maurice.
Thus, if God were to, by creative act of will, actualise a world in which Maurice
is presented with the board game buying quandary at time f, how would God
know if the world actualised was from the P set of worlds or the R set of
worlds?
Furthermore, if God doesn’t have full knowledge of what Maurice will do in this
situation, how could it be affirmed that God has complete free knowledge33?
The Molinist affirms that the only way for God to have complete free knowledge
is if God has complete knowledge of how Maurice, or any other free and un-
determined creature, will behave in any set of non-determining circumstances
(Flint, 1998, p. 40).
Let’s suppose that God knows that if Maurice is placed in a specific set of
circumstances at time f he will freely purchase the board game. This means
that God would know that if he brought about the aforementioned set of
circumstances regarding Maurice’s board game purchasing quandary at time
f, a P -world would result. This merely means that one of the P -worlds would
exist which isn’t enough to say that God has complete free knowledge of the
world actualised. God would need to know which of the P -worlds would exist
in order for God to have complete free knowledge of the world actualised. In
order to do this, God would have to know an innumerable number of other
counterfactuals, similar in nature, about Maurice and all other undetermined
beings (Flint, 1998, p. 38-41).
This is not a problem. As was noted at the beginning of this chapter34 (Flint,
1998, p. 12-22), the Molinist believes that God’s providential activity is not
33That is to say, how could it be possible that God could have complete foreknowledge but
not know which world had been actualised?
34See the section called Divine Providence.
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limited to Maurice or any one free agent. Rather, it is applicable to all free
creatures God may create and put in any non-determining set of circumstances.
Furthermore, this knowledge must form part of the knowledge which informs
God’s divine decree so that God can have full control over creation and God’s
free knowledge, thus it must exist prior to the divine decree35 (Flint, 1998,
p. 39-40). Therefore, “there can be no time at which his [God’s] decision
concerning a complete creative action has not been made” (Flint, 1998, p. 40),
which means that God must have known from eternity how Maurice, or any
other free and undetermined creature God may create, would choose in any
situation that creature may be placed and left free (Campbell, 2006, p. 3).
The way in which any free agent would choose to behave when put in a specific
set of circumstances at a specific time — that is to say, where a complete set of
non-determining circumstances can be specified into which a free agent could
be placed placed — is called a counterfactual of creaturely freedom (Flint,
1998, p. 40). Campbell defines a counterfactual proposition as “a subjunctive
conditional which presupposes the falsity of the antecedent” (Campbell, 2006,
p. 4). More simply put, a counterfactual of creaturely freedom can be thought
of as conditional propositions stating “how any creature God might create
would freely behave in any set of circumstances in which that creature might
be created and left free” (Perszyk, 2013, p. 755).
An example of a counterfactual of creaturely freedom could be “If Maurice
were put in a specific set of circumstances C at time f, Maurice would choose
to purchase a board game.” It is this knowledge which the Molinist believes
God would have to have prior to the divine decree in order for God to have
complete providential control over any world actualised by God. Thus, we can
say that the Molinist believes that in order for us to say that God has divine
providential control of our world, prior to the divine decree God must possess
knowledge of all true subjunctive conditionals. In addition, God must possess
knowledge of all necessary truth through which God comprehends all which is
possible (Flint, 1998, p. 36-40).
35God must know which of the sets of worlds God is creating if God is to have full control
over the world being created, therefore God must know how free creatures will decide prior
to the divine decree.
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At the same time, the Molinist affirms that none of this infringes on the free-
dom of the creatures being created. As Flint says:
Provided that God has knowledge of all the true counterfactuals
of creaturely freedom, there is no problem with either his exer-
cise of providential control over his world or his possession of free
knowledge (Flint, 1998, p. 40).
On this view, God is in no way determining an agent’s decisions. Irrespective
of whether God holds knowledge of how Maurice would choose, for example,
Maurice remains free to choose whether to purchase or to refrain from pur-
chasing the board game when put in a set of circumstances C at time f (Flint,
1998, p. 39-40).
Molina held that knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom could not
form part of God’s natural knowledge or part of God’s free knowledge. God’s
free knowledge is God’s knowledge of contingent truths which God controls and
has freely determined by means of God’s divine decree. God’s natural know-
ledge is made up of necessary truth which God does not control. Knowledge of
how free creatures would freely choose when placed in a set of non-determining
circumstances must take the form of contingent propositions which can’t be
controlled by God (Flint, 1998, p. 38-41).
With respect to the decisions of free creatures, counterfactuals of creaturely
freedom must take the form of contingent propositions which are determined
by the free agents themselves and not by God (Perszyk, 2013, p. 755-756).
This knowledge cannot form a part of God’s natural knowledge, because it is
not necessarily true36. Additionally, this knowledge exists prior to the divine
decree and as such cannot form a part of God’s postvolitional free knowledge
(Flint, 1998, p. 38-41).
This knowledge, instead, forms a part of God’s middle knowledge — aptly
named because it is said to exist between God’s natural and free knowledge
(Perszyk, 2013, p. 755-756).
36The free agent in question must have been able to choose from some number of actions in
order to be considered free.
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To understand how God’s middle knowledge solves the problem of foreknow-
ledge and sovereignty, Flint suggests we picture the three types of God’s know-
ledge within a growing narrative. First, God has knowledge of all necessary
truths through God’s natural knowledge. Second, God has knowledge of all
contingent truths not under God’s control by means of middle knowledge.
Through the combination of natural and middle knowledge, God has perfect
knowledge of what would occur as a result of any creative act (Campbell, 2006,
p. 1-3). Third, God chooses a creative act of will, thereby determining “not
only all the contingent creaturely events ultimately precipitated by God’s cre-
ative action” but also the content of all contingent truths God controls — that
which constitutes God’s free knowledge (Flint 1998:43).
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter began by defining three fundamental pillars the argument presen-
ted in this work: God’s attributes of divine providence and aseity, and human
free will. The Molinist affirms all three of these, but in affirming divine provid-
ence and human free will, a tension is found. To overcome this obstacle, God’s
knowledge is considered.
Natural knowledge and free knowledge are related to God’s divine will, with
free knowledge said to exist after God’s divine decree (Flint, 1998, p. 37-38).
Thus, God’s divine decree can only be informed by God’s natural knowledge.
The Molinist affirms that this is not enough for divine providence, as defined,
to exist, showing that God requires additional information if God’s will is to
be adequately informed. To bridge this gap, the Molinist affirms God’s middle
knowledge (Flint, 1998, p. 40).
One final aspect must be considered when considering the Molinist solution -
namely the possible worlds which Flint, Perszyk and Plantinga have spoken
about.
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Possible Worlds and Campbell’s
Objection
3.1 Introduction
Having briefly explored what the Molinist believes, attention is now turned
to understanding how this new structure of God’s knowledge outwardly works
itself through the concept of a possible world. In encountering possible worlds,
we find the objection to God’s middle knowledge which Travis Campbell raises
— a potential roadblock in adopting the doctrine of Molinism.
3.2 Possible Worlds
Understanding the make up of a possible world is very important if we are
to understand one of the traditional objections to Molinism. In this section,
the idea of a possible world will be defined, with special attention paid to the
relationship between possible worlds and middle knowledge.
As was noted in the previous chapter, counterfactuals of creaturely freedom,
middle knowledge and Molinism were brought to the attention of English
speaking philosophers during the 1970s by Alvin Plantinga when he set about
attempting to logically address the problem of evil (Plantinga, 1974b).
36
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As a part of his solution, Plantinga explores the concept of a possible world1.
Plantinga says that a possible world is “a way things could have been” (Plantinga,
1976, p. 139) or a state of affairs of some kind, where a state of affairs can
be defined as a propositional statement describing a reality in some sense2
(Plantinga, 1974a, p. 34-35).
So, Plantinga says that we can think of a state of affairs as being a description
of a world3. And for each state of affairs, there exists a propositional statement
1 Peter van Inwagen (van Inwagen, 1986) differentiates between two conceptions of possible
worlds with respect to states of affairs: Abstractionism and Concretism (van Inwagen,
1986, p. 185-187). Plantinga’s view of possible worlds is the Abstractionist view, on which
possible worlds are abstract objects with states of affairs making up the building blocks
which define any given possible world. David Lewis promulgates a Concretist conception
of a possible world in affirming that every object within a world is taken to be spaci-
otemporally related to the other objects within that world as well as the world itself. On
the Concretist view, there are no impossible worlds and all possibilities are realities in
some world. Our world is thought of as simply being where we are located (Lewis, 1986,
p. 69-70). The Concretist view holds that all possible worlds are actually concrete realities
which actually exist in the same way which our world exists. The Concretist view also
holds that all of these realities exist simultaneously whilst being distinct from one another
(Lewis, 1986, p. 1). Plantinga’s Abstractionist view of possible worlds has been criticised
by Christopher Menzel (Menzel, 1989) for lacking adequate formal rigor. A second ob-
jection to Plantinga’s view has been detailed by John Divers (Divers, 2002), who claims
that the structure of possible worlds as promulgated by Plantinga is in violation of Can-
tor’s Theorem. Lewis’ Concretist view of possible worlds also has trouble with Cantor’s
theorem, with David Kaplan (Kaplan, 1995) arguing as follows: If it is true that for any
given proposition p at any given time t, it is possible that only one person is entertaining
p, then it follows that for every proposition there must be one unique world – thus there
have to be at least as many worlds as there are propositions. But if every set of worlds is a
proposition, by Cantor’s Theorem we can say that there would be more propositions than
worlds, resulting in an internal contradiction (Kaplan, 1995, p. 42-44). A further objection
to Lewis’ view is that, on this view, there is space for only one necessary truth (Lewis,
1986, p. 55-59). This seems to be intrinsically problematic, as it seems to be clearly the
case that more than just one proposition would be necessarily true, though it should be
noted that Lewis takes this characteristic of his view to be a strength. Readers interested
in these objections are referred to the cited material.
2 In this regard, Plantinga concurs with David Lewis (Lewis, 1973).
3 Plantinga’s usage of the term “state of affairs” is completely different to the way in which
David Armstrong (Armstrong, 1993) uses the term. Armstrong takes a state of affairs to
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which describes that world. A state of affairs can be actual, in which case that
state of affairs is said to obtain. When a state of affairs is actual, we can say
that the propositional statement which corresponds with that state of affairs
is true4 (Plantinga, 1974a, p. 34-35).
Plantinga defines a state of affairs in further detail when he says:
A proposition p corresponds to a state of affairs s, in this sense, if
it is impossible that p be true and s fail to obtain and impossible
that s obtain and p fail to be true (Plantinga, 1974a, p. 35).
To be clear, on Plantiga’s view possible worlds are thought of as descriptions
of the way reality could be. These descriptions take the form of states of
affairs, so that a possible world is made up of a very large of states of affairs.
Additionally, each actual state of affairs has corresponding with it a proposition
which can be said to be true. In the event that a state of affairs can be said
to obtain, that state of affairs can be said to be actual. In the event that a
state of affairs is actual, the proposition which corresponds with that state of
affairs can be said to be true (Plantinga, 1974a, p. 34-35).
It is important to point out that just as there can be false propositions, so
too can there be false states of affairs. That is to say, in the same way that
propositional statements could exist while not being actual5, a state of affairs
could exist without needing be true. Thus, false states of affairs could exist6.
Therefore, we can consider a possible world to be a possible state of affairs
which could obtain but does not need to (Plantinga, 1974a, p. 35).
refer exclusively to facts.
4 For example, it is an actual state of affairs that “2 + 3 = 5”. Therefore, the proposition
“2 + 3 = 5” corresponds with the aforementioned state of affairs and can be thought to
be true.
5 For example, I could make the necessarily false propositional statement “Bachelor b is
married.” It is possible for this propositional statement to exist whilst being false.
6 A necessarily false state of affairs could be something like “2 + 3 = 23”. It could be
possible for this state of affairs to exist, but it could never obtain.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. POSSIBLE WORLDS AND CAMPBELL’S OBJECTION 39
All of this is to say that states of affairs need not exist necessarily. It is possible
that a state of affairs exist necessarily, but states of affairs are not necessarily
taken to exist necessarily. In fact, the vast majority of states of affairs are
considered to be contingent on Plantinga’s view.
It follows then that amongst the range of possible worlds, our world is one and
by virtue of being actual our world obtains (Plantinga, 1974a, p. 34-38).
William Lane Craig defines a possible world as “a maximal description of real-
ity, or a way reality might be” (Craig, 2008, p. 183). Craig suggests that
the best way to think of possible worlds is as “huge conjunctions p&q&r&s...,
whose individual conjuncts are the propositions p, q, r, s....” (Craig, 2008,
p. 183). A possible world would then be a collection of propositions which
would each individually make a claim and when put together, would maxim-
ally describe a possible world. To maximally describe a possible world is to
provide a description of a world where the addition of any further descriptive
propositional statements would either be tautological or would change some
aspect of that world (Plantinga, 1974a, p. 36).
Additionally, Craig stipulates that in order to be considered a maximal de-
scription of reality, these conjunctions would need to be made up of both
propositions and their contradictory so that nothing is omitted from the de-
scription of a possible world (Craig, 2008, p. 183).
Consider this example proposed by Plantinga (Plantinga, 1974a, p. 35-36):
Jim Whittaker was the first American to climb Mount Everest.
In order for this proposition to be true, the following propositions would also
need to be true:
Jim Whittaker is American.
Mount Everest can be climbed.
No American climbed Mount Everest before Jim Whittaker.
and so on.
We can then say that in order for a possible world to be a maximal description,
states of affairs must include any further states of affairs which are either
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logically necessarily true or logically necessarily false (Plantinga, 1974a, p. 35-
36).
In the example above, it follows from saying that “Jim Whittaker was the first
American to climb Mount Everest” that “Jim Whittaker is American.” Sim-
ilarly, the converse applies so that in saying “Mount Everest can be climbed”
one could not go on to say “Mount Everest cannot be climbed.”
Furthermore, in the event that a state of affairs A obtains and in doing so
precludes a state of affairs B — or vice versa - the conjunctive state of affairs
A and B is impossible. For example, it is impossible that both “Jim Whittaker
is the first American to climb Mount Everest” and “Ronald Reagan is the first
American to climb Mount Everest” be true at the same time (Plantinga, 1974a,
p. 35-36).
Thus, “If A precludes B, then A’s corresponding proposition entails the denial
of the one corresponding to B” (Plantinga, 1974a, p. 36).
Naturally, what is true of states of affairs must be replicated with respect to
their corresponding propositions. As Plantinga says:
Inclusion among states of affairs is like entailment among propos-
itions; and where a state of affairs A includes a state of affairs B,
the proposition corresponding to A entails the one corresponding
to B (Plantinga, 1974a, p. 35).
With all of this in mind, we can define a state of affairs as being complete
if it includes a proposition A as well as all propositions which are logically
necessary for A to obtain and all propositions which are logically negated by
A obtaining (Plantinga, 1974a, p. 36). Plantinga concurs with Craig when he
defines a possible world by saying:
A possible world is any possible state of affairs that is complete.
If A is a possible world, then it says something about everything;
every state of affairs S is either included in or precluded by it
(Plantinga, 1974a, p. 36).
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In summary, the view promulgated by Plantinga and Craig affirms that pos-
sible worlds are best thought of as a huge and complete state of affairs by
which a maximal description of reality is achieved. This state of affairs would
be maximally descriptive if, and only if, by adding to this description the de-
scription either changed or became tautologous. Furthermore, this state of
affairs would be required to include all logically necessary states of affairs and
logically negated states of affairs, thereby making the state of affairs com-
plete. Finally, the state of affairs describing a possible world must include a
corresponding proposition, describing the state of affairs (Plantinga, 1974a,
p. 34-39).
A number of further things can be said of possible worlds. Suppose we have
a number of possible worlds, each made up of a seemingly infinite — though
not actually infinite — number of propositions which form conjunctions to
maximally describe the aforementioned possible world. Now suppose we have
a proposition N which is necessarily true and is contained in God’s natural
knowledge7. The proposition N would then exist as a true proposition in all
possible worlds because it is a necessary truth (Plantinga, 1976, p. 140).
Similarly, if a proposition Q exists and is true in all possible worlds, we can
say that Q is a necessary propositional truth because all necessary truths exist
as necessary truth in all possible worlds8 (Plantinga, 1974a, p. 37).
Plantinga also says of possible worlds that “people (and other things) exist
in them” (Plantinga, 1974a, p. 37). Plantinga qualifies this by saying that
we obviously exist in this actual world but also that any person exists in any
world W where, had world W been actual, that person would have existed9.
7 For example, “All bachelors are unmarried.”
8 If it were to be necessarily true that “2 + 3 = 5”, then it would be the case that the
proposition “2 + 3 = 5” must be true in all possible worlds in addition to being contained
in God’s natural knowledge (Campbell, 2006, p. 2).
9 Speaking meaningfully of non-existent entities is notoriously challenging. Flint suggests
that the way to overcome this issue is to think of reference to entities or objects which
belong to possible worlds as propositions which refer to the “essence” of a creature rather
than the creature itself (Flint, 1998, p. 47). On this view, in saying that a person or an
object exists within a possible world, we are not referring to the object or the person and
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For example, if Maurice were to exist in world W, then Maurice would exist in
that world and be actual if that world were actual. In saying that a person, for
example, exists in a world we are not saying that person is actual, but rather
that the person forms a part of the maximal conjunctive description of the
possible world in question (Plantinga, 1974a, p. 37-38). It follows, then, that
Maurice exists in all possible worlds where the proposition “Maurice exists” is
part of the maximal conjunctive description of that world (Plantinga, 1974a,
p. 37-38).
Finally, a brief word must be devoted to the concept of a proposition. The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy provides the following advice:
The best way to proceed, when dealing with quasi-technical words
like proposition, may be to stipulate a definition and proceed with
caution, making sure not to close off any substantive issues by
definition fiat (McGrath, 2014).
Heeding this advice, we can look to Plantinga for a general idea of what he
means when he speaks of propositions.
Plantinga defines propositions as being “the sorts of things sentences are used
to express and assert” (Plantinga, 1974a, p. 38). That is to say, Plantinga takes
a proposition to be the semantic content of a sentence – a common way to treat
propositions10 (McGrath, 2014). On this view, we can derive propositions from
sentences by understanding the semantic value of a sentence.
we are using the term in a lightweight, non-ontologically committing sense. More will be
discussed on this point in the coming chapters.
10David Lewis (Lewis, 1980) believes that this is not an appropriate way to think of propos-
itions, arguing as follows: Consider the sentence “In the past, Reagan was president.” This
sentence seems to only be true if it is also true that Reagan was the president at some stage
prior to when that sentence was asserted. However, if this is true, then the truth value
of this sentence must change over time. If the sentence in question can change its truth
value over time, then it would seem to lack temporal qualification. A similar objection is
relevant when applied to sentences pertaining to location based assertions like “In Cape
Town, it is windy.” Lewis takes it to be the case that propositions must be qualified with
respect to spatial or temporal values. Lewis also believes that sentences cannot contain
spatial or temporal quantification. If the aforementioned is true, then it seems to be the
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. POSSIBLE WORLDS AND CAMPBELL’S OBJECTION 43
As such, the same sentence can be used to express different propositions, but
it is the proposition which is important to the make-up of possible worlds.
Conversely, when we describe propositions, we make use of sentences to convey
the semantic value which corresponds with the proposition in question.
So for example, the sentence “Maurice exists” could be used to speak of mul-
tiple different people, but the proposition “Maurice exists” would refer to one
very specific person11.
Possible worlds can then be thought of as a state of affairs, to which a pro-
position corresponds. That proposition is made up of individual propositions
which, when joined together, describes a world maximally. Our world is one
of these possible worlds and can be thought of as being actual.
3.3 The Molinist Solution
This section will show how the Molinist intends to tie the various aspects of
God’s knowledge together and, along with the concept of a possible world,
solve the problem raised by the conjunction of God’s divine attributes and
creaturely libertarian freedom.
At this stage it is clear to see how Molinists believe God’s middle knowledge
ties in with God’s omnibenevolence to benefit creation as a whole. Through
case that the semantic content of sentences cannot be taken to be propositions (McGrath,
2014). Jeffrey King (King, 2003) has made use of work in linguistics to criticise Lewis’
position by arguing that sentences can include spacial or temporal quantifiers. On King’s
view, to say something like “Somewhere it is raining” is to say “There is a location L
such that it is raining at L.” King argues that the same could be said regarding temporal
quantification (McGrath, 2014). Thus, on King’s view, Lewis’ objection is negated be-
cause we can take the semantic content of sentences to include the required information
in order for the meaning of those sentences to constitute a proposition (McGrath, 2014).
A number of other people have also criticised Lewis’ argument including Mark Richard
(Richard, 1982), Nathan Salmon (Salmon, 1989) and more recently Herman Cappelen and
John Hawthorne (Cappelen & Hawthorne, 2009). Clearly a number of different views ex-
ist regarding whether it is suitable or not to take the semantic content of sentences as
constituting propositions. Interested readers are referred to the aforementioned material.
11 The view of propositions which Plantinga has affirmed is shared by Molinists such as
Thomas Flint (Flint, 1998) and William Lane Craig (Craig, 2013).
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God’s prevolitional natural knowledge, necessary truths are known. As a result
of God’s middle knowledge, God has knowledge of all contingent, subjunctive
conditional not under God’s control. As a result, God can foreknow how any
free agent will freely choose when put in any given set of circumstances were
God to create that free agent.
Ken Perszyk confirms this when, in summarising the Molinist position, he says:
But armed with the notion of middle knowledge, Molinism (al-
legedly) provides an ingenious solution to these problems. God’s
creative decisions are guided by his middle knowledge of CCFs.
Since he has no control over their truth values, it is not up to him
which worlds are open to him to create. But which of the worlds
open to him is actual is completely up to him. (Perszyk, 2013,
p. 755-756).
God knows all necessary truths and all possibilities by means of God’s natural
knowledge (Campbell, 2006, p. 2). Thus, through God’s natural knowledge,
God comprehends all possible worlds. Through God’s middle knowledge, God
knows all contingent truths which exist outside of God’s control12 (Flint, 1998,
p. 41-43). By God being able to draw on both natural and middle knowledge,
God’s decree can be both shaped and guided such that God is empowered
to actualise a world which perfectly corresponds with the divine will without
infringing on the free will of free creatures (Flint, 1998, p. 43-45).
Perszyk goes on to say:
Since he knows by middle knowledge what each creature he might
create would do in any possible situation in which that creature
were placed and left free, he knows what he has to do to get the
world (from within the set open to him) that he wants. By selecting
the ‘right’ combination of creatures to create and circumstances
in which they are placed — i.e. by actualizing the ‘right’ set of
12Such as, for example, counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (Flint, 1998, p.41-43).
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antecedents of CCFs — God calls the shots by deciding which
world open to him is actual (Perszyk, 2013, p. 755-756).
Perszyk points out that the Molinist does not believe that God is able to create
any world. Naturally, worlds which are not possible cannot be created by God.
Similarly, in affording creatures freedom, and with God having certain fore-
knowledge of how these free creatures would act under certain circumstances,
options for which worlds are feasible13 for to God to create are produced (Flint,
1998, p. 46-59).
For example, suppose Maurice were to be a free agent who is free to purchase
a board game at a time f if placed in a set of circumstances C. Through God’s
middle knowledge, God would know if Maurice would freely choose to purchase
the board game or if Maurice were to freely refrain from purchasing the board
game if Maurice were to find himself free to choose in C at f. Now suppose
that through this knowledge, God knows that Maurice would in fact choose to
purchase the board game.
While it would be possible for God to actualise a world in which Maurice
refrains from purchasing the board game in C at f, doing so is not considered
feasible for God (Flint, 1998, p. 51-54). This is because if God were to actualise
a world in which Maurice refrains from purchasing the board game in C at
f, while knowing that had Maurice remained free Maurice would have instead
chosen to purchase the board game, God is no longer actualising a world in
which Maurice is free. God has instead actualised a world in which Maurice
is not free with respect to purchasing a board game in C at f.
Thus God is restricted to creating only feasible worlds due to the limitations
which arise by affording creatures free will14 (Flint, 1998, p. 51-54).
The Molinist contends that by endowing God with middle knowledge, God is
free to create while at no point infringing upon any free creature’s capacity to
13 Thomas Flint was the first to promulgate the concept of a feasible world in his works
Divine Freedom (Flint, 1980) and The Problem of Divine Freedom (Flint, 1983).
14A similar argument will be examined towards the end of this chapter.
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make free decisions. In this example, Maurice, as a free agent, continues to
find himself free in the possible world in question.
At the same time, through the freedom which God freely bestows upon created
agents, logical limitations are promulgated and the range of possible worlds
from which God could choose to create becomes limited to a number of feasible
worlds from which God could choose to create (Flint, 1998, p. 46-54).
Thus, prior to the divine decree, God knows which worlds are possible from
a range of seemingly infinite worlds, and what will ultimately happen if any
specific possible world were to be actualised. This allows God to know which
worlds are feasible, thereby giving God the ability to freely choose to create one
of the many feasible worlds. The Molinist claims that by God having middle
knowledge, God is able to simultaneously exercise perfect sovereignty over all
things while affording libertarian free will to the creatures God creates.
Perszyk illustrates this final point by saying:
In this way, middle knowledge allows us to explain how God can ex-
ercise complete and specific sovereignty over creation even if there
are (libertarian) free creatures. His providential plan for the world
is thus guaranteed to succeed even though creatures are free to do
otherwise in the circumstances in which they choose or act. (Per-
szyk, 2013, p. 755-756).
This Molinist solution has been applied to various aspects of theology and
has been used to promulgate theories and solutions to a wide array of topics
such as Christology (Flint, 2001), Soteriology (Rea, 2007), the inspiration of
scripture (Craig, 1999) and many more.
3.4 Campbell’s Objection
In this section, an objection to middle knowledge and the doctrine of Molin-
ism which was raised by Travis Campbell is introduced. Campbell’s objec-
tion draws on an older objection which was vocalised by Reginald Garrigou-
Lagrange, with Garrigou-Lagrange’s objection addressed in this chapter. Camp-
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bell’s objection is the core issue to be addressed in this work and is focused on
in subsequent chapters.
Travis Campbell (Campbell, 2006) objects to Molinism by claiming that by
postulating middle knowledge, Molinism compromises the aseity, or self ex-
istence, of God. In expounding upon his objection, Campbell defines God’s
aseity when he says:
When we say that God is self-existent, we mean to say all of the
following: that he is pure actuality (there is no potentiality [or
passive potency] in his being); that he is wholly independent and
uncaused; that he is his act of existing; and so forth (Campbell
2006:16).
In affirming this, Campbell largely concurs with the Molinist by saying that
God is self-existent, that God is God’s own act of existing, that God is wholly
independent and that God exists uncaused15.
Campbell, however, claims that this is not compatible with the middle know-
ledge promulgated by Molinism. In giving God middle knowledge, the Molinist
is saying that some amount of God’s knowledge is not self-determined16. God’s
knowledge of creaturely counterfactuals, for example, is determined by agents
who exist apart from God - the free creatures themselves - and not God. That
is to say, prior to the divine decree, God knows how any free creature would
act were that creature to be placed in any particular set of circumstances on
account of the fact that the, currently uncreated, free creature would in fact
act in that way17 (Campbell, 2006, p.16-17).
Campbell claims that the dependency created by relying on an external source
to complete some amount of God’s knowledge introduces passive potency,
thereby making “God (or, at least, some aspect of him) something less than
15See the section called Divine Aseity in Chapter 2.
16That is to say, some amount of God’s knowledge is not determined by God.
17 In affirming libertarian free will, it seems to be the case that the Molinist would concur
with this objection.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. POSSIBLE WORLDS AND CAMPBELL’S OBJECTION 48
absolutely independent” (Campbell, 2006, p. 16). This dependency, in Camp-
bell’s view, undercuts God’s aseity and as such one must decide: either God
has middle knowledge or God is wholly self-existent (Campbell, 2006, p. 16-19).
Campbell’s objection is not entirely new18. Initially raised by the neo-Thomist
Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, this view of middle knowledge and passivity it
introduces into God’s knowledge is based on the view that “divine knowledge
is the cause of its objects of knowledge” (Craig, 1991, p. 270). As a Thomist,
Garrigou-Lagrange believed that this necessitates God must determine the
truth value of all propositions known to God on account of God being First
Cause and Pure Actuality (Craig, 1991, p. 270).
We can rephrase Garrigo-Lagrange’s objection as such: As First Cause and
Pure Actuality, all things known to God must find their cause in God. None
of God’s knowledge can find its source in an external agent. By the Molinist
proposing middle knowledge, some amount of God’s knowledge no longer finds
its cause within God, thereby introducing passivity into God.
In a debate with the Molinist Adhmar d’ Als, Garrigou-Lagrange made his
point when he argued that middle knowledge creates an exception to divine
universal causality and introduces passivity into God because future contin-
gents are determined by agents outside of God (Craig, 1991, p. 270).
Garrigou-Lagrange made this point clear when he said:
It is because in God alone essence and existence are identical, be-
cause He alone is Being itself that we must conclude that only in
Him can there be no accident, that He alone is infinite, that noth-
ing that is external to Him can exist unless it has been created and
preserved in being by Him, that nothing external to Him can act
without the divine motion. Action, in fact, presupposes being, and
the mode of the action corresponds to the mode of the being that
is in action. God alone, who is His existence, who is Being itself, is
18 In publishing his objection to middle knowledge, Campbell underpins his objection by
drawing on Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange’s objection. The two are not the same, but Camp-
bell certainly sees them as being linked (Campbell, 2006, p. 16-19).
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consequently action itself, intellection itself, love that is itself etern-
ally subsisting. On the other hand, no creature, however perfect
it may be, since it is not its existence, is not its own thought and
will; but the most perfect angel, just as the least endowed human
soul, always is in need of the divine motion in order to think and
will anything whatever. Nothing, consequently, escapes the divine
motion except evil, which, being a defect, presupposes only a de-
ficient cause. It cannot come from God, but is permitted by Him,
because He is powerful enough and good enough to draw from it a
greater good that is known to Him, a glimpse of which is at times
given to us (Garrigou-Lagrange, 1934, p. 557-558).
Garrigou-Lagrange makes a number of points in this exchange. First, he be-
lieves that all things flow from God and are sustained by God. Garrigou-
Lagrange extends this to mean that all things which exist move only as promp-
ted by God, thereby denying the libertarian free will which the Molinist af-
firms19. Garrigou-Lagrange goes on to affirm his view that God is self-sufficient
and pure existence. In this, he believes that God is set apart from all other
entities or beings. Garrigou-Lagrange further reiterates his view that God in-
stigates action in external agents, although Garrigou-Lagrange does not believe
that evil is motivated by the divine will.
Garrigou-Lagrange held that God causes all the actions of free creatures and
as such, causes all things to happen. In knowing the the divine decree, God
knows all conditional future contingents and thus “divine knowledge is the
cause of its objects of knowledge” (Craig, 1991, p. 270-271). Furthermore,
Garrigou-Lagrange would affirm that because the divine will moves agents to
act, by creating God determines all actual contingents.
This led Garrigou-Lagrange to conclude:
God determines or he is determined, there is no in-between; either
things are the measure of the knowledge of free futuribles or else
19See the section called Libertarian Freedom in Chapter 2.
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it is their measure by reason of the decree of the divine will which
accompanies it (Philips, 1964, p. 325).
Dieu determinant ou de´termine´: either God determines all things or God is
determined. This can be rephrased as either God determines the content of
God’s knowledge, or God’s knowledge – and subsequently an aspect of God – is
determined without God’s control.
Garrigou-Lagrange clarified this by saying:
Either God’s knowledge is the cause of our free determinations or
else it is caused by them because Peter would choose, if he were
placed in certain circumstances, and because he will in fact choose
when he will be so placed (Philips, 1964, p. 325).
Here, Garrigou-Lagrange is saying that either Peter’s “free determinations”
are determined by God’s knowledge, or God’s knowledge is caused by how
Peter would choose were Peter to be placed in a set of circumstances and
left free with respect to a specific choice. In saying this, Garrigou-Lagrange
is specifying his qualm lies with the Molinist’s claim with respect to how
God’s middle knowledge – made up of prevolitional, contingent subjunctive
conditionals – interacts with God’s capacity to actualise any possible world.
Garrigou-Lagrange believed that in asserting that God is self-sufficient, it is
impossible for external agents to causally determine their own actions in any
way. To assert the latter would result in detracting from the former (Campbell,
2006, p. 16-17).
In responding to this objection, William Lane Craig recognises its validity but
denies it lacks the weight required to damage the Molinist’s position:
That leads to the second half of Garrigou-Lagrange’s objection,
that middle knowledge posits passivity in God. Despite Molinist
protests, I think we shall have to admit that this is true. But
at the same time, as I said above, this seems to me of no great
consequence (Craig, 1991, p. 272).
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Craig rightly acknowledges this problem on account of the fact that, on the
Molinist view, counterfactuals of creaturely freedom exist as propositions and
their truth values are determined by free creatures themselves and not by God.
Thus, God’s middle knowledge is made up of contingent propositions which
are not determined by God. In this respect, it appears as if the objection is un-
avoidable. Speaking of how middle knowledge is, at least partially, determined
by free creatures, Campbell points out that “every doctrine of middle know-
ledge one encounters in the literature implies this” (Campbell, 2006, p. 16).
Craig seeks to devalue this objection by arguing that God’s foreknowledge is
determined by what will occur:
God’s simple foreknowledge can be understood as determined in
its content by what will in fact occur. This sort of determinacy or
passivity on God’s part seems to me altogether innocuous, and if
this sacrifices the Thomistic view of God as Pure Actuality, then
so be it (Craig, 1991, p. 272).
Craig argues here that God’s prevolitional knowledge of contingent subjunctive
conditionals is simply that – knowledge of contingent subjunctive conditionals.
It may be true that God does not determine these, but is also true that these
will occur only if God actualises the requisite possible world. On Craig’s view,
if this detracts from God’s Pure Actuality as understood on Thomism, “then
so be it” (Craig, 1991, p. 272).
Nevertheless, Craig has a further response to this objection. Craig claims that
by making God responsible for both the truth of future contingent proposi-
tions and the truth of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, human freedom
is denied and God is made to be the author of sin (Craig, 1991, p. 272-273).
Could it not be the case that God’s omnipotence is enough to overcome this
challenge20?
20That is to say, if God is omnipotent, would it not be possible for God to be able to overcome
the challenge of both determining God’s knowledge whilst not affirming determinism?
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Thomas Flint and Alfred Freddoso (Flint & Freddoso, 1983) propose that
the the problem should be considered from the perspective of God’s power21
and how any decision made by God might consequentially provide a logical
limitation for God. Flint and Freddoso provide the following example (Flint
& Freddoso, 1983, p. 93-98). Consider the following situation:
Suppose a non-omnipotent and free agent called Jones is placed in a set of
circumstances C such that he is free with respect to writing a letter to his wife
at a time t. If this is the case, in the set of circumstances C at time t, Jones
has the power to actualise one of the following:
(1) In C at t Jones freely decides to write a letter to his wife.
(2) In C at t Jones freely decides to refrain from writing a letter to his wife
(Flint & Freddoso, 1983, p. 94-95).
We can clearly see that (1) and (2) are diametrically opposed to one another
and as such it is impossible for both (1) and (2) to simultaneously obtain in
the set of circumstances C at time t. That is to say, it is impossible for Jones
to be in C at t and freely choose to both write a letter to his wife while freely
refraining from writing a letter to his wife.
Furthermore, Jones is a free agent. As such, no one apart from Jones can at
time t have the power to actualise (1) while also having the power to actualise
(2) (Flint, 1998, p. 23). Thus in the set of circumstances C at time t, only one
of the following can be true of Jones:
(3) If Jones were in C at t he would freely decide to write a letter to his
wife.
(4) If Jones were in C at t he would freely decide to refrain from writing a
letter to his wife (Flint & Freddoso, 1983, p. 94-95).
As a free agent, only Jones has the power to determine whether (3) or (4) is
true. Even God’s omnipotence is not enough for God to be able to simply
21I have previously referred to this as God’s omnipotence.
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decree which state of affairs should come about, and as a results God does not
have the power to actualise every state of affairs22. This should be taken to
mean that God could freely choose to actualise C at time t, placing Jones in C
at time t, but when doing this God could not choose whether (1) or (2) would
obtain.
For example, if (3) were true, then God could actualise the set of circumstances
C at time t but God would be unable to bring about (2) because Jones in C
at t would freely decide to write a letter to his wife. The converse is similarly
true. If (4) were to be true, God could actualise the set of circumstances C at
time t but would be unable to actualise (1) (Craig, 1991, p. 273).
If God were to create Jones in the same set of circumstances C at the same
time t, but Jones were not free with respect to writing a letter to his wife,
then God could choose to actualise a world where either Jones would choose
to write a letter to his wife or where Jones would refrain from writing a letter
to his wife. Thus, it would only be possible for God to choose which state
of affairs God wanted to actualise if God were to deny Jones freedom (Craig,
1991, p. 273).
And because all of this results “solely from the logically necessary truth that
one being cannot causally determine how another will freely act” (Flint &
Freddoso, 1983, p. 95), this should not be viewed as anything which detracts
from God’s omnipotence in any way23.
Craig readily admits that on the Molinist view, the problem of detraction
from God’s pure actuality as understood by Garrigou-Lagrange and Campbell
persists (Craig, 1991, p. 274). Having said that, in viewing this limitation as
being a logical one, God’s omnipotence is not any more restricted that it is by
saying that God could not create a married bachelor, for example.
22 The Molinist claims that God can create an world which is feasible, not that God can
create any world.
23 Suppose for example that God had chosen to create agents which were not free. Were
that to be the case, God would not be restricted in the same way.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, the concept of a possible world was introduced. States of af-
fairs and propositions were discussed, with possible worlds being taken to be
abstract in nature and operating as maximal descriptions of any potential real-
ity (Craig, 2008, p. 183-184). The Molinist makes use of these possible worlds
to show that, through middle knowledge, God would have all the adequate
information required to make a maximally informed decision when choosing to
create (Perszyk, 2013, p. 755-756). By having this knowledge, God is able to
create a world in which everything which happens is actively chosen by God
whilst being able to create creatures who are free with respect to their free
choices (Flint, 1998, p. 40).
Travis Campbell’s objection to Molinism and middle knowledge was then es-
tablished (Campbell, 2006, p. 16-19), with Campbell claiming that middle
knowledge requires God to look outside of the triune Godhead in order to
complete God’s middle knoweldge. Campbell’s objection, while distinct, draws
on the objection raised by Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange (Garrigou-Lagrange,
1934, p. 557-558). Garrigou-Lagrange believed that all of God’s knowledge
must be self-determined in order for God to remain a se (Craig, 1991, p. 270).
An attempt to undercut this objection was then presented in the form of a lo-
gical limitation with respect to God’s omnipotence affirmed to exist by Thomas
Flint and Alfred Freddoso (Flint & Freddoso, 1983, p. 93-98).
Molinism certainly does deny some aspects of Thomism, though this seems
to be logically determined by the Molinist’s affirmation of libertarian free will
(Craig, 1991, p. 270-274). Due to this limitation being a logical one, it seems
likely that an all-encompassing solution to this problem does not exist.
Campbell’s objection that middle knowledge detracts from God’s self-existence
remains untouched and it is to this that we will now turn our attention. The
Molinist affirms that God’s middle knowledge exists prevolitionally and as sets
of propositions24. As such, in order to better address this problem, more must
24 If it is the case that the free creatures God creates begin to exist only after the divine
decree – or perhaps at the time of the divine decree, if one affirms a B-Theory of time –
then it seems to be the case that the creatures themselves could not cause God’s middle
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be said about propositions, possible worlds and abstract objects.
knowledge. Thus, God’s middle knowledge must take the form of a proposition.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter 4
Abstract Objects: Realism and
the Singular Term Argument
4.1 Introduction
Campbell’s objection to Molinism is that by giving God middle knowledge,
the Molinist creates a scenario where God must rely on external sources in
order to have complete knowledge (Campbell, 2006, p. 16-19). That is to
say, God’s middle knowledge is completed by drawing on external sources.
Middle knowledge manifests itself as subjunctive conditionals which exist as
propositional statements occuring prior to God’s decree and are collated and
combined with God’s natural knowledge so as to maximally describe possible
worlds (Perszyk, 2013, p. 755-756).
Possible worlds and propositions are taken to exist as abstract objects, and as
such in this chapter the concept of an abstract object will be explored (Craig,
2012, p. 441). Once defined, some number of the realist views of abstract
objects will be explored with the intention being to show which views are
open to the Molinist and which views are closed to the Molinist.
4.2 Abstract Objects
What can be said of abstract objects? Paul Gould explains that terms and
predicates such as properties, propositions, relations, sets, numbers and pos-
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sible worlds would fall into the class of objects called abstract objects (Gould,
2011a, p.255-256). William Lane Craig concurs with this view when he says:
Metaphysicians take the distinction between concrete and abstract
to be exclusive and exhaustive and typically provide paradigm ex-
amples of each kind of object: if such things exist at all, people,
electrons, mermaids, and planets would be concrete objects, whereas
mathematical objects (like numbers, sets, and functions), prop-
erties, and propositions would be abstract objects (Craig, 2012,
p. 441).
On the view Craig articulates, abstract objects can’t be concrete objects and
vice versa. David Bell affirms that abstract objects include things like numbers,
sets and propositions but goes on to say that abstract objects are “non-spacial,
atemporal, non-causal and, hence, imperceptible” (Bell & Hart, 1979, p. 135).
The view that abstract objects exist outside of space-time and without causal
relations is one which has been affirmed by a number of philosophers includ-
ing Gottlob Frege (Frege, 1960, 1956), Bertrand Russell (Russell, 1912), Kurt
Godel (Godel, 1947) and Willard Quine (Quine, 1948). More recently, this
view of abstract objects has been considered and approved by a number of
philosophers of mathematics including Hilary Putnam (Putnam, 1971), Stew-
art Shapiro (Shapiro, 1997) and Mark Colyvan (Colyvan, 2001).
Craig points out that because concrete objects are things which exist spacio-
temporally, it is often thought that any object which doesn’t exist spacio-
temporally must then be an abstract object (Craig, 2012, p. 441-442). The
classical theist, and indeed the Molinist, would object to this view on the
grounds that this rule of thumb is deficient if it is true that God exists. On
the classical theistic view, God is considered to be a personal entity who, at
least at some point, existed apart from space-time, yet created our universe
and continues to causally interact with space-time as concrete objects typically
would. Thus, Craig suggests, one defining difference between concrete and
abstract objects is that the latter are “virtually universally agreed” to be
causally impotent (Craig, 2012, p. 441-442).
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By saying abstract objects are causally impotent, we mean to say that abstract
objects don’t stand in cause-effect relationships1 (Craig, 2012, p. 441-442).
Something like a number, for example, could never cause anything to happen.
Craig goes further in saying:
Numbers, for example, do not cause anything. More than that,
their causal impotence seems to be an essential feature of abstract
objects. The number seven, for example, does not just happen to
lack all causal effects; there is no possible world in which seven
could effect something. (Craig, 2012, p. 441-442).
Craig argues that causal impotence separates abstract objects from other ob-
jects which are causally isolated from the world but might have otherwise been
causally related to the world. The theist, for example, may view God as having
the potential to enter into causal relations with the world while affording God
the freedom to choose not to enter into causal relations with the world. By
having the potential to relate causally, God is not causally impotent and thus
could not be considered to be an abstract object even if God had chosen not
to causally relate to the world after it had been created (Craig, 2012, p. 442).
Defining objects as being abstract or concrete by means of negation was first
promulgated by Frege and further expounded upon by David Lewis (Lewis,
1986). The method of distinction between abstract and concrete objects which
Craig subscribes to is widely accepted and named the Causal Inefficacy Cri-
terion by Gideon Rosen2 (Rosen, 2014).
As has been illustrated, this work takes possible worlds to exist as maxim-
ally descriptive propositional statements which outline reality in some sense3
1 Alvin Plantinga holds that as mental objects, abstract objects could stand in causal
relations in the same way that thought and thinker can stand in causal relations. That is
to say, a thinker causes a thought to come into being which constitutes a causal relation
(Plantinga, 2011, p. 288).
2 The second method of distinction is to affirm that abstract objects exist as both causally
impotent and non-spatially. This is called the Non-Spatiality Criterion (Rosen, 2014).
3 See the section called Possible Worlds in Chapter 3 of this work.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 4. ABSTRACT OBJECTS: REALISM AND THE SINGULAR
TERM ARGUMENT 59
(Plantinga, 1974a, p. 34-35). This view, then, puts possible worlds into the
class of abstract objects. This view of possible worlds as abstract objects is
held by Alvin Plantinga and shared by a number of philosophers including
Robert Adams (Adams, 1974), Roderick Chrisholm (Chrisholm, 1976) and
John Pollock (Pollock, 1984).
It stands to reason, then, that in order to best respond to the objection raised
by Travis Campbell, the Molinist must formulate a view of abstract objects. Of
course, the conundrum of the relationship between abstract objects and God
is nothing new (Gould, 2011b, p. 255) and a great deal of what is applicable to
the theist will be applicable to the Molinist. Having said that, the constraints
provided by middle knowledge mean a slightly different perspective is required.
Craig argues that there are broadly three approaches to abstract objects: that
they exist — the realist approach — that they do not exist — the anti-realist
approach — and that there is no fact on the matter as to whether abstract
objects exist or not — the arealist approach (Craig, 2016, p. 202-207).
It should be noted that the anti-realist position is often called nominalism.
Craig intentionally avoided the name nominalism, considering it to be a poten-
tial stumbling block for those trying to understand his position (Craig, 2016,
p. 202-207). Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra reports that the term nominalism
could refer to the rejection of abstract objects or the rejection of universals4.
While both the rejection of abstract objects and the rejection of universals
argue based on similar grounds, each can be held independently of the other
(Rodriguez-Pereyra, 2015). It is this confusion that Craig wishes to avoid.
Each of these three views of abstract objects is mutually exclusive — by select-
ing one, the others are precluded. The remainder of this work will endeavour
to review some number of these options and show which are available to the
4 Universals can be said to be things which can be instantiated. That is to say, if redness
is a universal, then every object which is red can be considered to be an instance of the
universal red. Properties, relations and kinds are considered to be universals. Where
abstract objects are typically considered to include universals, as well as other things such
as propositions or numbers, universals are not considered to include abstract objects, such
as numbers (Rodriguez-Pereyra, 2015).
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Molinist based on philosophical and theological5 motives. The first view ex-
amined will be the platonist view.
4.3 Platonism
The view that uncreated, mind-independent, abstract objects exist is called
platonism (Craig, 2016, p. 201). Just as above, the platonist views abstract
objects as being causally impotent. Additionally, the platonist asserts that ab-
stract objects are non-spacial, non-temporal and unchanging (Balaguer, 2016).
The platonist would distinguish between abstract and concrete objects by
making use of the Non-Satiality Criterion rather than the Causal Inefficacy
Criterion (Rosen, 2014).
In asserting that abstract objects exist mind-independent, the platonist is
saying that abstract objects exist in the external world as entities (Craig,
2012, p. 442-443). They are not minds, they do not exist in minds as ideas,
nor are they physical in any way. Yet, on the platonist view these abstract
objects exist in the external world in a real way, similarly to the way concrete
objects exist Balaguer (2016).
Platonism can be divided into two categories: lightweight platonism and heavy-
weight platonism. Heavyweight platonism is the view that abstract objects
really exist apart from minds, as has been outlined above. The heavyweight
platonist would assign the same level of existence to a number as they would
to Maurice or his board game, for example (Craig, 2016, p. 201).
Øystein Linnebo explains that lightweight platonism, on the other hand, ex-
ists somewhere between “full fledged platonism” and anti-realism6 (Linnebo,
2013). Lightweight platonism claims that abstract objects are not objects in
the typical sense, but rather that they are “the referents of certain abstract
singular terms” (Craig, 2012, p. 442).
5 By theological motivation, I mean motivation based on theological concerns - that is,
concerns found in Scripture or Christian tradition.
6 Anti-realism will be discussed in further detail in chapter 5.
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That is to say, in the event that a term w contributes to the truth value of a
sentence in which it occurs, that term contributes to the semantic value of the
sentence. In doing this, w refers to an abstract singular term (Linnebo, 2013).
For example, consider the true sentence “there is a hole in my shirt.” The
lightweight platonist would affirm that a hole in my shirt is an object because
in a true sentence like “There is a hole in my shirt”, the hole in my shirt
is a referent of the term “hole in my shirt”. The lightweight platonist sees
these objects as semantic referents — that which we speak about when we
use abstract terms. These terms, like “the hole in my shirt”, need not exist in
order for us to meaningfully speak of their existence7 (Craig, 2016, p. 201-202).
Bob Hale states as much when he says:
If it is taken as invoking the everyday notion of object, the ques-
tion whether there are abstract objects is devoid of philosophical
interests; its answer is quite certainly that there are not, but that
is trivial — a great many kinds of thing beside those whose title to
be recognised as abstract objects has been taken seriously by philo-
sophers fail to count as objects in that sense (Hale, 1987, p. 26).
Hale agrees that abstract objects are not objects in the ordinary sense of the
word, and as such do not exist.
John Burgess characterises the lightweight platonist view when considering
ontological metaphysics by converting the question of whether numbers exist
from an ontological question into a theological question:
Did it or did it not happen, on one of the days of creation, that God
said, ’Let there be numbers!’ and there were numbers, and God
saw the numbers, that they were good? (Burgess, 2004, p. 30-31).
7 The example chosen here is no accident. Discourse surrounding non-existent objects is
notoriously challenging, with singular terms making reference to non-existent objects not
an option on classical logic. Thus, to speak about “the hole in my shirt” on classical logic
is not possible. This will be discussed in further detail in chapter 5.
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Burgess goes on to say:
If as I believe the theological question does make sense, and as I
suspect it is the only sensible question about the italics-added real
or capital-R Real existence of numbers, then I would answer that
question in the negative; but then I would equally answer in the
negative the question of the Real existence of just about anything
(Burgess, 2004, p. 30-31).
Burgess, then, believes that very few things truly exist in the metaphysically
heavy sense, including abstract objects. Burgess’ lightweight platonistic view
of abstract objects, like that of Hale’s, is more similar to the view characterised
by conceptualism or anti-realism8 (Craig, 2012, p. 442).
Lightweight platonism poses no threat to the Molinist because, on this view,
possible worlds and other abstract objects do not exist. They do not exist apart
from God to undercut God’s aseity in any way9 - they simply do not exist.
Heavyweight platonism, however, poses a serious threat to the Molinist. The
heavyweight platonist would affirm that infinite abstract objects actually exist
uncreated and alongside God eternally (Craig, 2016, p. 201). The heavyweight
platonist would affirm that the propositions and possible worlds contained in
God’s middle knowledge actually exist apart from God, who would then be
dependent upon something which exist apart from God for middle knowledge
to be complete10.
On the heavyweight platonist view, Travis Campbell’s objection provides a ser-
ious problem for the Molinist, successfully undercutting God’s aseity11 (Camp-
8 Conceptualism will be discussed in this chapter while anti-realism will be discussed in
Chapter 5.
9 Thus, on a lightweight platonist view, abstract objects are not required to exist apart
from God. Therefore, God’s middle knowledge can exist while simultaneously asserting
that God is wholly self-existent.
10Thereby making God something less than wholly self-existent.
11Campbell’s objection explored in greater detail in the section called Campbell’s Objection,
in chapter 3.
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bell, 2006, p. 16-19). What motivation exists to adhere to heavyweight pla-
tonism?
4.4 The Indispensability Argument
Heavyweight platonism, henceforth referred to simply as platonism, promul-
gates the view that we are committed to the existence of abstract objects by
many of the statements we believe to be true (Balaguer, 2016). These true
statements could be, for example, mathematical statements like “1 + 1 = 2” or
descriptive statements like “Fido is a dog” and so on (Craig, 2012, p. 442-443).
On platonism, in asserting that “Fido is a dog” is true, we are committed to
believing that Fido, the dog, actually exists.
Platonists claim that in order to preserve theories found in natural sciences,
abstract objects commonly found in mathematics, such as numbers, must exist.
Craig expresses this when characterising the platonist claim in saying:
Reference to and quantification over abstract objects, particularly
mathematical objects, is simply indispensable to natural sciences,
and therefore the truth of those theories requires that the abstract
objects referred to and quantified over exist (Craig, 2012, p. 442).
This view of abstract objects existing essentially is one which has been affirmed
by a number of philosophers such as Willard Quine (Quine, 1948), Hilary
Putnam (Putnam, 1971) and Mark Colyvan (Colyvan, 2001).
The argument that singular terms are indispensable is referred to by Craig as
the Indispensability Argument (Craig, 2016, p. 210) and by Mark Balaguer,
the philosopher of mathematics, as the Singular Term Argument (Balaguer,
2016). Balaguer expresses the general form of this argument as follows:
(1) If a simple sentence (i.e., a sentence of the form “a is F ”, or “a is R-
related to b”, or. . .) is literally true, then the objects that its singular
terms denote exist. (Likewise, if an existential sentence is literally true,
then there exist objects of the relevant kinds; e.g., if “There is an F ” is
true, then there exist some F s.)
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(2) There are literally true simple sentences containing singular terms that
refer to things that could only be abstract objects. (Likewise, there are
literally true existential statements whose existential quantifiers range
over things that could only be abstract objects.) Therefore,
(3) Abstract objects exist (Balaguer, 2016).
A number of things should be noted about this argument.
The first premise of the argument states a criterion of ontological commitment
(Balaguer, 2016). This means that from any sentence, we can tell what must
exist in order for that sentence to be true. Balaguer defines a criterion of
ontological commitment as such:
A criterion of ontological commitment is a principle that tells us
when we are committed to believing in objects of a certain kind in
virtue of having assented to certain sentences (Balaguer, 2016).
The criterion of ontological commitment shows us what we are committed to
believing exists.
The first segment of premise one of the argument stipulates that we are on-
tologically committed by singular terms. Balaguer defines a singular term as
a denoting phrase which refers to a specific object (Balaguer, 2016). Singular
terms would include such things as proper nouns, definite descriptions like “the
oldest South African” and demonstrative expressions like “this board game”
(Craig, 2012, p. 442).
Balaguer distills this by saying:
If you think that a sentence of the form “a is F ” is true, then you
have to accept the existence of the object a, but you do not have
to accept the existence of a property of F ness (Balaguer, 2016).
That is to say, if we believe a simple sentence such as “Fido is a dog” is literally
true, we must believe the object denoted by the singular term “Fido” literally
exists. However, based on the first premise, we are not committed to the
existence of the property dogness or doghood (Balaguer, 2016).
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Another thing to note is that the first premise stipulates that the sentence in
question must be considered to be literally true. Sentences containing meta-
phors may be true but ontological commitment does not follow from these
sentences. For example, a person saying “it is raining cats and dogs” could be
communicating truth, namely that it is raining heavily, but this person would
not be committed to cats or dogs falling from the sky. Thus, singular terms in
non-literal speech cannot be considered to be ontologically committing (Bal-
aguer, 2016).
The second segment of premise one claims that we are ontologically committed
by existential statements in the same way that we are ontologically commit-
ted to singular terms. That is to say, sentences with existential quantifiers
are similarly ontologically committing. Existentially quantified statements are
statements which are true of some of the members of a domain of quantific-
ation. For example, if the domain of our quantification is dogs, the sentence
“some dogs are called Fido” is true if at least one member of the domain of
our quantification is called Fido (Balaguer, 2016).
In first order logic, these existentially quantified statements can be expressed
as:
(∃x)Fx (Balaguer, 2016)
So that we could express the sentence “some dogs are called Fido” in first
order logic as:
(∃x)(x is a dog & x is called Fido) (Balaguer, 2016)
We can read the above as “There exists an x such that x is a dog and x is
called Fido.” Thus, in order for the sentence “some dogs are called Fido” to
be true, at least one dog must be called Fido.
Existentially quantified statements are just as ontologically committing as
simple sentences with singular terms. On the platonist view, the person mak-
ing these kinds of statements is committed in the heavyweight sense to the
existence of the abstract objects referred (Balaguer, 2016). For example, when
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a platonist says “some triangles are equilateral” that person is ontologically
committed to the existence of triangles, some of which are equilateral.
The first premise of the Singular Term argument expresses a meta-ontological
claim regarding how a person commits themselves ontologically (Bricker, 2014).
The first premise stipulates that singular terms and existential quantification
are devices of ontological commitment12 (Balaguer, 2016).
The second premise claims that the singular terms in literally true simple
sentences must refer to abstract objects. That is to say, they cannot refer to
concrete objects, figurative objects or anything of that nature. The objects
referred to must be abstract, and as such, we are committed to abstract objects
which literally exist in the external world on the platonist view. The same can
be said for literally true existentially quantified statements which quantify over
abstract objects13.
Thus, statements like “2 + 2 = 4” or “there are prime numbers greater than
100” must be thought of as literally true and literally referring to existent,
abstract objects in the same way that “Fido is a dog” would refer to a literal
dog14.
From the first two premises, the conclusion (3) follows.
It would seem that if the Molinist is to preserve God’s aseity by defeating
Campbell’s argument, the Platonist’s Singular Term argument must be either
circumnavigated or successfully objected to in some way. Alternatively, one
could show that abstract objects existing apart from God do not undermine
God’s aseity in some way — the view we will encounter first.
12That is to say, on the platonist view by reading these sentences as being literally true, one
can say that the singular terms referred to must be grounded in reality.
13Thus, on the platonist view one cannot quantify over objects objects which cannot be or
are not to be grounded in reality.
14 For the platonist, then, to speak of Fido the dog as existing carries the same level of
ontological commitment as making true mathematical statements like “2 + 2 = 4”, for
example. For the platonist, the singular term “4” exits in the same way that Fido, a real
dog, would.
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4.5 Uncreatable Abstract Objects
Peter van Inwagen is a theist who holds to platonism, claiming that the pla-
tonist’s Singular Term argument is correct (van Inwagen, 2015b, p. 289). Van
Inwagen attempted to get around the problem of God’s aseity and platonism
by making two arguments. First, that not all of reality apart from God needs
to have been created by God (van Inwagen, 2009, p. 4-7), and second, that it
is unreasonable to consider abstract objects as things which could be created
(van Inwagen, 2009, p. 7-11).
Van Inwagen initially claimed that his view did not contradict the Nicene
Creed because built into the Nicene Creed is a limitation that God could only
create things which could be created (van Inwagen, 2009, p. 3-5).
The passage of the Nicene Creed which van Inwagen has in mind is15:
I believe in one God, the Father, Almighty, Maker of heaven and
earth and of all things visible and invisibe;
And in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, be-
gotten of the Father before all worlds, God of God, Light of Light,
very God of very God, begotten, not made, being of one substance
with the Father; by whom all things were made (Grudem, 2000,
p. 1169).
Thus, van Inwagen believes that when we say that God has created everything,
we are speaking of only things which can be created. As a result, if we think
abstract objects are things which can’t be created, we cannot be referring to
them when we say that God created everything16 (van Inwagen, 2009, p. 3).
Van Inwagen contends that this view is similar to the view which affirms that
God’s inability to make square circles or married bachelors does nothing to
detract from God being maximally powerful (van Inwagen, 2009, p. 3).
15Once again, I have quoted a segment of the Nicene Creed as revised at Constantinople in
A.D. 381.
16Van Inwagen contends that when we say God created all things, we can be speaking of
all things which can be created. Things which cannot be created would include necessary
things such as abstract objects or God.
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Van Inwagen’s view can be summarised as such17: If one is happy to affirm that
it is not logically possible for God to create a square circle, then one should
be happy to say that God did not create abstract objects because abstract
objects are uncreatable – they cannot be created.
Van Inwagen has since backtracked on this view and agrees with Craig that no
such limitation exists in the Nicene Creed (van Inwagen, 2015a, p. 300-302),
even going as far as to explicitly stating as much:
I think Craig is very likely right when he tells his readers that
when the fathers made statements like ”God is the creator of all
things” (always excepting himself-and I leave questions about the
ontology of evil out of the discussion), they meant their use of the
universal quantifier to be absolutely unrestricted (van Inwagen,
2015a, p. 302).
Here, van Inwagen affirms that the Nicene Creed carried no internal limitation
such that when it is claimed that God is the creator of all things, no thing
apart from God can be thought of as existing outside of this range.
For the Molinist, van Inwagen’s view is particularly problematic. Leaving aside
problems regarding creation18, van Inwagen’s view still sees abstract objects
as existing uncreated and alongside God in a very real sense – exactly the
problem which Travis Campbell has pointed out and the objection which the
Molinist should attempt to avoid.
As such the Molinist, tasked with preserving God’s aseity as classically under-
stood, could end their investigation here with van Inwagen’s view eliminated
as a possibility. Nevertheless, it would be somewhat remiss not to consider
17 It should be reiterated that van Inwagen’s fundamental assumption is that the Singular
Term argument is correct. This argument will be further addressed in Chapter 5.
18The Molinist has previously been shown to concur with the classical theist that God can
be seen as being Creator, where this is typically considered to be taken that God is the
cause of all reality extra se. In recent years, William Lane Craig has engaged in further
research in this field in an attempt to show that this is the case (Craig, 2016, p. 202-205).
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van Inwagen’s philosophical reasoning for holding that abstract objects are
uncreatable.
Van Inwagen argues that creation is a causal relation. But given abstract
objects cannot enter into causal relations, abstract objects cannot have been
created. Therefore, if abstract objects exist, they exist uncreated19 (van Inwa-
gen, 2009, p. 5).
Van Inwagen’s second premise, that abstract objects cannot enter into causal
relations, is not universally accepted. Stipulating that they be considered as
thoughts in the divine mind, Plantinga suggests that propositions could enter
into causal relations in the same way that a thought and a thinker interact:
these objects can enter into the sort of causal relations that holds
between a thought and a thinker, and we can enter into causal
relation with them by virtue of our causal relation to God. It
is therefore quite possible to think of abstract objects capable of
standing in causal relation (Plantinga, 1996, p. 121).
Nevertheless, to appeal to the view that abstract objects can stand in causal
relations does seem to be a case of moving the goalposts. Abstract objects
being defined as causally impotent by means of the Causal Inefficacy Criterion
is a big part of how they are set apart from concrete objects, so to now de-
cide that abstract objects can stand in causal relations when an inconvenient
argument has been raised seems inconsistent.
A satisfactory solution to the philosophical component of van Inwagen’s claim
is highly complicated and not without objection. For example, Paul Gould
19 In saying this, van Inwagen is forced to say that all abstract objects which exist, exist
uncreated and thus necessarily. Van Inwagen does, in fact, admit that this is his view (van
Inwagen, 2009, p. 6-7). This should not be construed to mean that all abstract objects
exist as necessarily true, just that their existence is necessary. As van Inwagen points
out, in order for this to be true a controversial thesis of modal metaphysics called Serious
Actualism must be thought of as true (van Inwagen, 2009, p. 7). On Serious Actualism, all
properties and relations are necessarily existence entailing (Menzel, 2016). Readers further
interested in Serious Actualism are referred to work by Alvin Plantinga (Plantinga, 1983),
Kit Fine (Fine, 1985) and Christopher Menzel (Menzel, 1991).
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claims that God can create free abstract objects20. Gould affirms that van
Inwagen has not adequately defended his view that God cannot create abstract
objects, doing so by appealing to the work done by John Carroll (Carroll, 2009)
and James Woodward (Woodward, 1990) on anti-reductionism in relation to
causation (Gould, 2014).
Gould concurs with van Inwagen by contending that abstract objects exist
necessarily, but differs by stipulating that an object existing necessarily does
not mean that the object in question existed at all times. That is to say,
Gould holds that necessary objects can exist as created – Gould’s view is that
necessary abstract objects can begin to exist (Gould, 2014, p. 103).
To do this, Gould promulgates two concepts of necessity: scope necessity and
nature necessity. Scope necessity says “if x exists necessarily, then x exists
in every possible world” (Gould, 2014, p. 104). Nature necessity says “if x
exists necessarily, then the cause or reason for x ’s existence is included in its
own nature; that is, x has no external cause for its existence” (Gould, 2014,
p. 104). Gould founds this view on the idea that modal facts are distinct from
essential facts21 (Gould, 2014, p. 104).
Part of how Gould argues this is by making the point that any entity which
were to be created by God in all possible worlds would also need to be thought
of as existing necessarily22. Thus, Gould claims that a necessary entity does
not need to exist uncreated, and could be thought of as being both necessary
and created (Gould, 2014, p. 106).
20Where a free abstract object is one which can be thought of as existing apart from any
connection to or dependence on a contingent object or entity (van Inwagen, 2009, p. 7).
21 Gould achieves this distinction by appealing to the work of Kit Fine (Fine, 1994) who
affirms that modal facts are distinct from essential facts. For example, on this view,
one could agree that one person has one body and one mind while disagreeing regarding
the essential properties of persons by saying that perhaps persons are really just minds
which happen to have bodies (Gould, 2014, p. 104). Interested readers are referred to
work by Hugh McCann (McCann, 2012), who also argues that essential existence does not
necessitate necessary existence.
22For example, suppose God were to create an entity x in every world such that x is not God,
x would have to be considered as a necessary entity. x would then have scope necessity
but not natural necessity (Gould, 2014, p. 106).
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Simultaneously, if all entities which exist as created in possible worlds which
are distinct from God depend on God, then it would be true to say that these
entities would exist dependent upon God23 (Gould, 2014, p. 106).
Gould claims that it is necessarily true for God as a necessary being to create all
necessary objects24 (Gould, 2014, p. 107). That is to say, it is necessarily true
that God will create all necessary objects. In saying this, Gould endows God
with the essential property of creating necessary objects or entities (Gould,
2014, p. 107-108).
Gould argues that the causal relationship between God and necessarily ex-
istent abstract objects25 runs only in one direction, claiming that the anti-
reductionism work regarding causation done by Carroll (2009) and Woodward
(1990) provides a credible line of reasoning regarding how it could be that
only one side of the necessary being – necessarily existent abstract object equa-
tion can be causally responsible while the other side of the equation remains
causally impotent (Gould, 2014, p. 108-110).
Gould’s view opens itself up to the bootstrapping criticism26 by saying that
God causes necessarily existent abstract objects to exist whilst already pos-
sessing the necessarily existent property of being able to create all necessarily
existent objects – a circular argument. Gould has responded to this objection
by arguing that it is possible for God to possess properties which are necessary
by affirming that they exist a se27 (Gould, 2011b, p. 56-57). How one would
come to develop a criterion for deciding which properties exist a se and which
do not remains ground for further investigation.
23 In the case of the created entity x where x is not God, x would then be an entity which
is created, dependent on God and an entity which possesses scope necessity.
24Here, Gould appeals to the work of Brian Leftow (Leftow, 1989), who affirms that if God
exists necessarily, and an object exists necessarily, then it is true that there can be no
world in which God fails to cause the existence of necessary objects (Leftow, 1989, p. 144).
25Such as properties.
26The bootstrapping argument will be considered again in the following section.
27That is to say, Gould claims it would be possible for God’s necessary properties to exist
as a part of God and a se, and that all other necessary abstract objects, along with all
other reality, would exist as created by God.
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While Gould’s view remains one which is interesting whilst requiring further
investigation28, his objection to van Inwagen’s platonic theism does nothing
to make the view that uncreated abstract objects exist alongside God any
more viable for the Molinist. On van Inwagen’s view, abstract objects exist
uncreated and alongside God, thereby creating a scenario where God does
need to rely on external propositions which exist apart from God, all of which
would seem to make God something other than wholly self-existent.
4.6 Absolute Creationism
Absolute creationism is a view promulgated by Thomas Morris and Chris-
topher Menzel which holds that abstract objects exist, that these abstract
objects depend on God to exist and that these abstract objects exist in the
mind of God (Morris & Menzel, 1986, p. 354).
Some amount of controversy exists around absolute creationism, with Craig
asserting that it is often conflated with divine conceptualism29. Craig takes
absolute creationism to be the view that abstract objects exist apart from God
while still being causally dependent upon God (Craig, 2016, p. 206-207).
In considering absolute creationism, Paul Gould holds a slightly different view
and affirms that absolute creationism:
locates the platonic horde within the mind of God as created, and
thus dependent, entities. Properties and relations are identified
with divine concepts, and the rest is built up from there. Proposi-
tions are just divine thoughts. Numbers, sets, and possible worlds
are also explicated in terms of properties and relations (that is,
divine concepts) and propositions (that is, divine thoughts). Im-
portantly, God creates all reality distinct from God, including the
entire Platonic horde (Gould, 2011a, p. 265).
28Gould’s view also appears to be very similar to absolute creationism, which will be dis-
cussed next.
29Divine conceptualism is the view that abstract objects exist in the mind of God (Craig,
2016, p. 209).
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 4. ABSTRACT OBJECTS: REALISM AND THE SINGULAR
TERM ARGUMENT 73
Craig and Gould agree that Morris and Menzel promulgate the view that
abstract objects exist as entities which began to exist and were created by
God, but differ on whether these entities exist in the mind of God or not.
This confusion is noted by both Craig (2016:206-207) and Gould (2011a:265-
266) and is to be expected when examining Morris and Menzel’s work on the
matter. Consider the following excerpt:
[Morris and Menzel] suggest, to begin with, that all properties
and relations are God’s concepts, the products, or perhaps better,
the contents of a divine intellective activity, a causally efficacious
or productive sort of divine conceiving (Morris & Menzel, 1986,
p. 355).
Here, Morris and Menzel assert that properties and other abstract objects are
a product of God’s thought – their view as portrayed by Gould.
However, in summarising their view, Morris and Menzel say:
We have here a view which both retains the commitments of realism
concerning the objective existence and status of abstract entities
and modal truths, while at the same time capturing the conviction
of anti-realists and conventionalists that such items must be in
some sense mind-dependent (Morris & Menzel, 1986, p. 361).
Here, Morris and Menzel affirm that the abstract objects created by God exist
objectively in such a way as to concur with the realist, or platonist, view –
their view as portrayed by Craig.
Paul Copan and William Lane Craig register their confusion on this topic when
they say:
Morris and Menzel present their view as an updated version of the
Augustinian theory of divine ideas and, hence, as a version of what
we (below) call conceptualism. Nevertheless, although that is their
intention, they continue to speak of the products of God’s intellec-
tual activity as abstract entities, which suggests the interpretation
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that abstract objects are created things external to God and caused
by divine intellectual activity (Copan & Craig, 2004, p. 174-175).
Whether this objection is justified or not, what is certainly true is that both
Craig and Gould agree that Morris and Menzel’s view sees abstract objects as
having been created and that they exist. Despite their difference in opinion
with respect to whether the absolute creationist locates the platonic horde in
God’s mind or not, both Craig and Gould share the same objection to absolute
creationism as promulgated by Morris and Menzel.
Craig and Gould both agree that absolute creationism suffers from what is
called the bootstrapping problem (Craig, 2016, p. 6-8). This objection can be
formulated as such: Morris and Menzel affirm that all properties are created
by God (Morris & Menzel, 1986, p. 355), but in order for God to be able to
create a property, God would already have to possess properties required for
the creation of properties – a circular argument (Craig, 2016, p. 206-208).
Craig points this out when he says:
In order to create properties, God must already possess properties.
For example, in order to create the property of being powerful God
must already possess the property of being powerful, which involves
a vicious circularity (Craig, 2016, p. 206-207).
Paul Gould expresses the same objection, even going as far as to say that he
considers the problem to be fatal for the absolute creationist (Gould, 2011a,
p. 268-269).
In postulating a potential solution for the absolute creationist, Craig suggests
that one could affirm that God has the ability to create a property without
having the property of being able to create properties (Craig, 2016, p. 206-
207). In doing this, however, the absolute creationist would be pushed towards
embracing anti-realism where “talk of properties is just a convenient fac¸on de
parler” because no motivation for realism would remain30 (Craig, 2016, p. 206-
30 Where speaking about abstract objects without committing to their existence could be
seen as being similar to lightweight platonism.
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207).
Gould provides a similar solution by saying that one could simply affirm that
only properties apart from those which God embodies would be created by
God. The properties which are essential to God’s being would then exist a se
within the divine mind as uncreated, “brute facts” (Gould, 2011a, p. 268).
Both Craig (Copan & Craig, 2004) and Gould (Gould, 2011b) have argued
their positions further respectively.
While it is possible that one or both of these solutions would be open to
the theist, a further problem exists for the Molinist. Molinism claims that
God’s act of creating occurs between God’s middle knowledge and God’s free
knowledge, such that God’s free choice to create is informed both by natural
knowledge and middle knowledge. If God’s middle knowledge is made up of
abstract objects such as possible worlds and propositions, and God’s middle
knowledge exists prior to the free act of creating (Flint, 1998, p. 43), it is
logically incoherent to think of God as having created abstract objects. That is
not to say that absolute creationism is an impossible position for the Molinist,
though adhering to the position would require further refinement31.
4.7 Divine Conceptualism
Conceptualism, sometimes referred to as psychologism, is the view that ab-
stract objects exist as thoughts or concepts in minds which are called men-
tal objects (Balaguer, 2014, p. 6). This view can not be considered to be a
platonist view, because platonism stipulates that abstract objects are to be
considered mind-independent (Balaguer, 2014, p. 3), thus psychologism, or
conceptualism, falls into the category of anti-platonic realism (Craig, 2016,
p. 208).
31One could affirm that creation of abstract objects could exist prior to the creation of our
universe, though understanding creation in this way would not be congruent with seeing
the divine decree as being both the full act of creation while also being informed by God’s
middle knowledge, as is the way the divine decree is seen by the Molinist (Plantinga,
1974b, p. 173-181). For more on the divine decree, see the section called God’s Knowledge
in Chapter 2 of this work.
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On psychologism, objects falling into the class of abstract objects are con-
sidered to be mental objects which actually exist in a mind (Balaguer, 2014,
p. 6), and sentences about these objects are simply descriptions about those
ideas. For example, the sentence “3 is a prime number” would simply describe
an idea which exists in a mind (Balaguer, 2016). Thus, on psychologism to
speak of the number 3, for example, the number would need to exist in a mind
as a mental object.
Viewing abstract objects in this manner has been around for a very long time,
with Frege (Frege, 1960) providing particularly strong criticism of considering
mathematical objects in this way during the 19th century (Balaguer, 2014,
p. 6).
One of Frege’s arguments was that there simply aren’t enough objects in hu-
man minds to sustain the number of objects referred to in mathematics (Bal-
aguer, 2016). For example, in mathematics certain set theories postulate actual
infinites, but there is no reason to believe that infinites could exist in the minds
of finite humans (Balaguer, 2014, p. 6) This argument, along with a number
of other arguments, “essentially buried” psychologism (Balaguer, 2016).
Frege’s objection is certainly true when speaking of finite human minds, but
as Craig points out, does not hold when applied to an infinite, divine mind32.
Thus, divine conceptualism views abstract objects as being entities of God’s
mind — they are in some way God’s thoughts which we can analyse (Craig,
2016, p. 208-209).
Greg Welty (Welty, 2006) is a recent proponent of divine conceptualism who
holds that abstract objects such as properties, propositions, possible worlds
and mathematical objects would not exist until conceived of by God, thereby
making them dependent upon God (Craig, 2016, p. 209). Furthermore, on
Welty’s view these abstract objects exist purely conceptually and within the
mind of God (Gould, 2011a, p. 269-270).
On conceptualism, a propositional statement like “3 is a prime number” simply
describes an idea in a mind (Balaguer, 2016). Similarly on Welty’s divine
32For example, there is no reason to believe that an infinite, divine mind could not think of
an infinite number of things at any given time.
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conceptualist view, propositions are taken to be the semantic content of a
sentence33 and as such, a proposition is simply a description of the truth found
in God’s mind (Welty, 2004, p. 55-56). Similarly, Welty views universals as a
means to explain attributes across multiple objects34 (Welty, 2004, p. 56-57).
Craig points out that in affirming these abstract objects exist in a non-real way
as dependent entities, but within God, the nerve between divine conceptualism
and realism appears to have been severed35 (Craig, 2016, p. 209).
Divine conceptualism affirms that abstract objects need to exist in God’s mind
in order for external agents to refer to them. Thus for any proposition, irre-
spective of whether that proposition is true or not, the thought that proposition
corresponds to would have to be actively located in God’s consciousness at all
times (Craig, 2016, p. 209). The same would be true for other abstract objects
like properties, numbers, sets and so on.
One of the problems with this view is that there is no reason to believe that
God would in fact be consciously considering every proposition at all times.
That is to say, even if God does know all true things at any given time, it
does not follow that God entertains all of these thoughts in consciousness at
all times. Craig demonstrates this by saying:
But conceptualists move far too hastily from the fact that God
is omniscient to the view that all that God knows is occurrent in
consciousness. God’s infinite knowledge is clearly not sufficient to
guarantee that there are the actual mental events needed by the
conceptualist (Craig, 2016, p. 209).
Craig considers the fact that God would be required to hold inane proposi-
tional truths such as “for any real number r, r is distinct from the Taj Mahal”
33Propositions were further discussed in the section Possible Worlds in Chapter 3 of this
work.
34For example, both a ball and a house having the attribute of being red.
35 Gould holds a similar view, saying that on Welty’s view “abstract objects do not exist
realistically for God” (Gould, 2011a, p. 270).
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in consciousness at all times to be unlikely given the triviality of these state-
ments36 (Craig, 2016, p. 209).
A worse problem would be considering God to hold false propositional state-
ments in conscious thought at all times. Consider, for example, “for any real
number r, r is identical to the Taj Mahal” – a necessarily false propositional
statement. Craig points out that there is little reason to believe God would
hold this proposition in conscious thought constantly, yet this is what divine
conceptualism requires. However, this is still a possibility, as Craig notes:
Obviously, the concern is not that God would be incapable of keep-
ing such a non-denumerable infinity of thoughts ever in conscious-
ness, but rather why He would dwell on such trivialities (Craig,
2016, p. 209).
For the Molinist, however, this represents a deeper problem. Molinism defines
God’s knowledge as existing as natural knowledge, middle knowledge and free
knowledge. Through God’s natural knowledge, God knows what is necessarily
true. Through God’s middle knowledge, God knows contingent truths which
exist beyond God’s control. Through God’s free knowledge, God has perfect
knowledge all contingent truths which are under God’s control (Flint, 1998,
p. 43).
The Molinist makes truth claims about God’s knowledge, stating that God’s
knowledge is made up of true things37. On the Molinist view, God’s knowledge
provides no space for necessarily false proposition like “for any bachelor b, b
is married” or “1 + 2 = 12” or any other proposition which can be considered
36That is not to say that God could not do this, just that Craig believes it is rather strange
to think this would be the case.
37Consider for example God’s knowledge with respect to counterfactuals of creaturely free-
dom. The Molinist holds that God knows all true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom,
not that God knows the truth value of all counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. Were the
latter to be true, God would know if a counterfactual of creaturely freedom, in proposi-
tional form, possessed the property of being true or not. On the former, God’s knowledge
is limited to only true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (Flint, 1998, p. 41-43).
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to be necessarily false. How, then, would God come to know the necessarily
false propositions in order for external agents to refer to them?
Nevertheless, divine conceptualism is not entirely ruled out for the Molin-
ist. God could hold necessarily false ideas in conscious thought, while know-
ing those ideas are false, for the explicit purpose of allowing external agents
to refer to them. The Molinist could affirm that God could come to know
which necessarily false propositions to retain in conscious thought by means
of middle knowledge. Through middle knowledge, God could come to know,
for example, the necessarily false propositional statement itself by means of
knowing which necessarily false propositional statements would be referenced
by external agents under any given set of circumstances.
For example, if a person were to affirm that “bachelor b is married” under a
specific set of circumstances C, God would be able to entertain consciously
the idea of b being married if C were actual. God would know this would be
necessary by means of middle knowledge and be able to entertain the idea so
that any person could make reference to the idea propositionally.
Therefore, divine conceptualism remains an option for the Molinist, although
some amount of further complexity is introduced.
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, abstract objects have been defined and the review of positions
on abstract objects has begun. The platonist view that abstract objects liter-
ally exist as uncreated entities has been established and it has been asserted
that if the Molinist were to adopt one of the platonist positions, Campbell’s
objection to middle knowledge would carry severe weight. This is because, on
one of these views, the content of God’s middle knowledge would exist in a
very real way, uncreated and apart from God. God would have to draw from
outside of the triune Godhead to complete the middle knowledge proposed by
Molinism.
Having explored the platonist’s Singular Term argument, it has been shown
that the Molinist could either undercut the argument by showing abstract
objects are created and thus depend on God, or the Molinist must successfully
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 4. ABSTRACT OBJECTS: REALISM AND THE SINGULAR
TERM ARGUMENT 80
object to one or both of the premises of the Singular Term argument. Both
divine conceptualism and absolute creationism have been shown to be possible
avenues for the Molinist, with both requiring further refinement. In the next
chapter, the arealist position will be considered before examining anti-realist
options.
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Chapter 5
Abstract Objects: Arealism and
Anti-Realism
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter examined the platonist’s Singular Term argument and
how it interacts with the claim that abstract objects being located in reality
is necessary for scientific theories to be true. Abstract objects as uncreated
entities was considered, as well as two views which consider abstract objects to
exist as entities which are in some way dependent upon God. In this chapter,
the view that no fact of the matter regarding the existence of abstract objects
will be discussed before some anti-realist views are offered as alternatives.
5.2 Arealism
Arealism is primarily a philosophy of mathematics position which affirms that
the question “do mathematical objects exist?” does not have an objective
answer (Craig, 2015, p. 274-275). Notable proponents of this view are philo-
sophers of mathematics Mark Balaguer (Balaguer, 1998) and Penelope Maddy
(Maddy, 2011).
Arealism finds its classical roots in the work of Rudolf Carnap (Carnap, 1956),
whose work is referred to as conventionalism (Craig, 2015, p. 274). Carnap
held that questions of existence could only be answered within linguistic frame-
works. Examples of these frameworks could be the framework of mathemat-
81
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ics, the framework of propositions, the framework of objects and so on. On
Carnap’s view, existence questions can take the form of internal existence
questions or external existence questions (Chalmers, 2009, p. 80).
Internal existence questions are answered within the linguistic framework that
the relevant object is a member of, bearing in mind that linguistic frame-
work’s axioms and rules of logic (Bricker, 2014). For example, a mathematical
question1 like “are there prime numbers greater than 100?” is to be answered
based on the axioms and rules of logic relevant to the mathematical linguistic
framework.
When questions of existence are posed concerning the general objects pro-
posed by the linguistic framework, answers are obvious simply because they
are assumed to exist by the framework in question (Bricker, 2014).
External existence questions would then be questions which are asked about
reality apart from any particular linguistic framework. Carnap held that these
questions can be neither true nor false (Chalmers, 2009, p. 80). They “are
pseudo-questions lacking any cognitive meaning” (Bricker, 2014).
Consider, for example, the question “do numbers exist?” on Carnap’s view.
Construed as an internal question, the answer is trivial. Within the frame-
work of numbers, the existence of numbers is presupposed and therefore it is
obvious that numbers exist. Answered as an external question, the question
“do numbers exist?” can be neither true nor false (Bricker, 2014).
Considered externally, the best one could do would be to consider whether it is
appropriate to accept any given linguistic framework for the question at hand.
On Carnap’s view, selecting any framework was a matter of convention, hence
the term conventionalism2 (Bricker, 2014).
1 That is, a question which is related to an object which counts itself a member of the
framework of mathematics.
2 Carnap was a pluralist, claiming that philosophers could subscribe to multiple different
theories with varying degrees of ontological commitment. Carnap’s view was that there
was no discrepancy to be found between the ontological commitment required by different
linguistic frameworks (Carnap, 1956, p. 221).
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William Lane Craig takes arealism, or conventionalism with regards to putative
abstract objects, to be the position that no fact of the matter exists regarding
whether abstract objects exist or not (Craig, 2016, p. 206). Would this not be
an option for the Molinist?
It would seem not. Craig argues that arealism is not an option for any theist.
As a result of divine aseity, God exists necessarily. As such, God exists in
all possible worlds (Plantinga, 1976, p. 140). In aligning themselves with the
classical theist, the Molinist sees reality which exists extra se as being created
by God. Thus, a fact of the matter regarding putative abstract objects must
be true in all possible worlds: Either abstract objects exist as created by God
or they do not exist at all (Craig, 2016, p. 206-207). Therefore, a fact of the
matter regarding the existence of putative abstract objects most certainly does
exist3.
With all of this in mind, it seems as if the arealist position is not one which is
open to either the theist or the Molinist.
5.3 Anti-realism
In previous chapters, it has been shown that three broad approaches to abstract
objects exist. Realism holds that abstract objects actually exist in the same
way that concrete objects like board games exist (Craig, 2015, p. 274-275). In
thinking abstract objects exist, we could consider them to exist as uncreated
entities or as entities which are dependent on God and began to exist at some
point. Platonism, the position that uncreated abstract objects exist, is the
position which presents the greatest threat to God’s aseity on the Molinst
view (van Inwagen, 2009, p. 4-11).
Considering abstract objects to be created, as is the case with absolute cre-
ationism (Craig, 2015, p. 274), presents the theist with the problem of the
bootstrapping objection - a potentially fatal objection. For the Molinist, this
3 Even if one were to affirm the existence of uncreated abstract objects, as Peter van
Inwagen does (van Inwagen, 2009), one would still be positively affirming a fact of the
matter regarding the existence of abstract objects.
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view seems to be problematic due to the proposed sequence of events, as ab-
stract objects are required to exist – if indeed they do exist – prior to God’s
free act of creating (Flint, 1998, p. 43).
Of the realist positions, divine conceptualism (Gould, 2011a, p. 269-271) ap-
pears to be the most viable though not without philosophical concern. In
considering abstract objects to be God’s thoughts and not entities which ex-
ist as created and apart from God, it appears as if the nerve between divine
conceptualism and realism is severed – but this does nothing to detract from
the view’s viability for the Molinist (?, p. 209).
Arealism, the view that affirms that no fact of the matter regarding the exist-
ence of abstract objects exists, is an avenue which appears to be closed to both
theists and Molinists (Craig, 2015, p. 274-275). So what then of anti-realism?
Anti-realism is the view that abstract objects simply do not exist (Craig, 2015,
p. 274-275). From the Molinist’s position, anti-realism seems to be the position
which poses the least threat to the God’s aseity, simply because on this view
no abstract objects exist for God to draw on. If anti-realism is true, possible
worlds, propositions, numbers, sets and shapes do not exist in a metaphysically
heavyweight sense at all.
In fact, the platonic theist Peter van Inwagen has explicitly stated that he
believes it is better to believe that abstract objects don’t exist if this option is
available4 (van Inwagen, 2004, p. 107).
On the anti-realist position, abstract objects simply do not exist (Craig, 2016,
p. 210). The content of middle knowledge does not exist in a real way5, which
means that God’s knowledge is wholly self-contained. As such the objec-
tion which Travis Campbell (Campbell, 2006, p.16-19) raises regarding middle
knowledge is sidestepped entirely, making this option appealing for the Molin-
ist.
4 Van Inwagen’s view is examined in the section called Uncreated Abstract Objects in Chapter
4.
5 By this I mean, in a real way in the same way that you or I as concrete objects exist.
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A number of views exist within anti-realism, all of which go about establish-
ing their view by objecting to one or both of the premises of the Singular
Term argument put forward by platonism. Theologically6, the Molinist may
be motivated to choose one of the anti-realist views simply because it could
be thought to be better to deny the existence of abstract objects. Establish-
ing which of these options is the correct choice for the Molinist would be an
immensely complex and potentially an impossible endeavour. As such, that is
not the aim of this thesis.
Rather, this work will simply aim to show some of the anti-realist options
which exist and highlight how each view goes about objecting to one or both
of the premises of the platonist’s Singular term argument. No argument will
be presented to show that any one of these views is to be considered better
than another.
For reference, here is the Singular Term argument as formulated by Mark
Balaguer:
(1) If a simple sentence (i.e., a sentence of the form “a is F ”, or “a is R-
related to b”, or. . .) is literally true, then the objects that its singular
terms denote exist. (Likewise, if an existential sentence is literally true,
then there exist objects of the relevant kinds; e.g., if “There is an F ” is
true, then there exist some F s.)
(2) There are literally true simple sentences containing singular terms that
refer to things that could only be abstract objects. (Likewise, there are
literally true existential statements whose existential quantifiers range
over things that could only be abstract objects.) Therefore,
(3) Abstract objects exist (Balaguer, 2016).
The first of the anti-realist views which will be explored is called fictionalism.
6 By theologically, I mean motivation based on theological concerns - that is, concerns found
in Scripture or Christian tradition.
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5.3.1 Fictionalism
Fictionalism promulgates the view that sentences purporting to be about ab-
stract objects are not literally true on account of the fact that abstract objects
do not exist. In saying this, the fictionalist accepts (1), but rejects (2). As an
anti-realist, the fictionalist affirms that no sentence about an abstract object
can be literally true because abstract objects do not exist (Balaguer, 2014,
p. 8).
Fictionalism treats abstract objects as useful fictions, thereby allowing simple
sentences with singular terms which make reference to abstract objects to be
considered to be fictionally true (Craig, 2012, p. 443).
For example, on the platonist view the sentence “Hamlet was Danish” cannot
be literally true because the singular term “Hamlet” does not refer to a real
person. Nevertheless, the platonist could say that it is true to say that Hamlet
was Danish in the play Hamlet written by Shakespeare. Characterised in
this way, the statement “Hamlet was Danish” is fictionally true (Craig, 2012,
p. 443).
The fictionalist affirms that similar treatment can be applied to sentences
with singular terms which make reference to putative abstract objects such as
numbers. For example, the mathematical sentence “2 + 2 = 4” is not literally
true because the singular terms “4” and “2 + 2” do not exist. Nevertheless,
the fictionalist would say that according to the standard model of arithmetic,
the statement “2 + 2 = 4” could be considered to be fictionally true (Craig,
2012, p. 443-444).
The fictionalist uses this position to undercut the claim made by platonists
that abstract objects are indispensable given their importance to true scientific
theories (Craig, 2012, p. 443-444).
The platonists’ argument as construed by the fictionalist can be formulated as
such:
(i) Mathematical sentences form an indispensable part of our empirical the-
ories of the physical world — i.e., our theories of physics, chemistry, and
so on;
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(ii) We have good reasons for thinking that these empirical theories are true,
i.e., that they give us accurate pictures of the world; therefore,
(iii) We have good reasons to think that our mathematical sentences are true
and, hence, that fictionalism is false (Balaguer, 2015).
Two different responses to this argument have been formulated by fictionalists,
the first by Hartry Field (Field, 1980) and the second by Mark Balaguer (Bal-
aguer, 1996, 1998), though this second response has been further developed by
Gideon Rosen (Rosen, 2001), Stephen Yablo (Yablo, 2005), Mary Leng (Leng,
2010) and others.
Field’s response can be called hard-road fictionalism and is characterised by
the rejection of (i). Field argues that mathematics is not indispensable with
regards to natural sciences, claiming that scientific theories can be nominalized
or reformulated in such a way as to avoid making reference to abstract objects.
Showing this to be true would be an inordinately large task, as each scientific
theory would have to be dealt with in turn7. This claim is highly controversial
and has a significant number of detractors8 (Balaguer, 2015).
The second fictionalist response, which can be called easy-road fictionalism9,
accepts (i) but interprets this view from the fictionalist perspective. Easy-road
fictionalists claim that hard-road fictionalism is not only a task which is likely
impossible to complete, but also does not integrate with science as well (Bal-
aguer, 2015). Balaguer argues that the fictionalist takes abstract objects to
be causally impotent, and as a result true scientific theories which make use
of numbers are made up of two components: a mathematical component and
a natural component10. The mathematical component is concerned with ab-
7 That is to say, on hard-road fictionalism every scientific theory would have to be indi-
vidually reformulated so that mathematical objects such as numbers were omitted whilst
preserving the truth of the scientific theory in question.
8 For example, detractors such as David Malament (Malament, 1982) have argued that
Field’s endeavour could never be applied to quantum mechanics.
9 Joseph Melia (Melia, 2000) refers to this view as weasel fictionalism.
10By natural component, I mean a component which makes reference to concrete objects in
some sense.
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stract objects while the natural component is concerned with concrete objects.
Thus, true scientific theories are made up of two components, each of which is
concerned with a different class of object.
The fictionalist affirms that these components can be considered to be true or
not true independently of one another because they are made up by objects
from different classes (Balaguer, 2015).
On this view, Balaguer argues that the fictionalist can choose to affirm that
concrete objects exist, and as a result the component of a scientific theory
which concerns itself with concrete objects is true, but that the component
regarding abstract objects does not obtain because abstract objects do not
exist. This leads the fictionalist to conclude that scientific theories which
make use of abstract objects are not literally true, but they still provide a
description of reality which is accurate (Balaguer, 2015).
Thus, the fictionalist affirms that simple sentences which make reference to
abstract objects, such as mathematical sentences or scientific theories, are not
literally true. However, this does not mean that these sentences are devoid of
truth or value, just that they are not literally true. The fictionalist affirms that
literal truth is significantly less important than fictional truth. Therefore, our
mathematical sentences being not literally true is inconsequential (Balaguer,
2014, p. 8).
Easy-road fictionalism is not without detractors. Both Mark Colyvan (Co-
lyvan, 2002) and Alan Baker (Baker, 2005) argue that mathematics plays
both an explanatory role and a descriptive role in science11. For example,
Baker provides an example of how mathematics plays a role in evolutionary
biology by explaining why the nymphal stage of a species of cicada fly is either
13 years or 17 years long (Baker, 2005, p. 229-233). Baker reports that vari-
ous evolutionary biologists have claimed that the reason the nymphal stage
is either 13 years long or 17 years long is because both 13 and 17 are prime
numbers (Baker, 2005, p. 230-231). Baker’s contention is that this constitutes
an example of how mathematics explains a physical phenomena rather than
simply describing it (Baker, 2005, p. 236-237).
11As opposed to simply a descriptive role.
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A variety of scholars have remained unconvinced by Colyvan and Baker’s
claims, responding with varying levels of criticism12.
Within fictionalism, two different views exist regarding how we come to know
whether a simple sentence with singular terms making reference to abstract
objects would be true or not.
Consider the following: on a fictionalist view neither of the mathematical
sentences “2 + 2 = 4” and “2 + 2 = 5” are literally true, yet it is the case
that one of these sentences is fictionally true. How would one come to know
which one of these sentences is fictionally true?
The first view, again promulgated by Field (Field, 1980), claims that we should
consider each sentence based on a relevant story, or fiction, to determine
whether this sentence is true or not. For example, neither the sentence “Santa
wears a green coat” nor the sentence “Santa wears a red coat” could be con-
sidered to be literally true13 (Balaguer, 2015). But based on the fictional story
of Santa, “Santa wears a red coat” is fictionally true. Field argues that the
same can be said of mathematical sentences, so that the fictionalist would say
that the mathematical sentence “2 + 2 = 4” is true based on the story of
mathematics14 (Balaguer, 2015).
Field contends that the story of mathematics is made up of currently accepted
mathematical systems and axioms such as the Peano axioms. It is from these
currently accepted systems and axioms which we must draw in order to come
to know the story of mathematics (Field, 1998). This view is called formalistic
fictionalism (Balaguer, 2015).
The second view, called non-formalistic fictionalism, objects to the first by
pointing out that the truth of mathematical statements ought to exist object-
ively and therefore cannot be based on the currently accepted mathematical
systems, as these have the potential to change over time (Balaguer, 2015).
12Some of these responses are provided by Joseph Melia (Melia, 2002), Mary Leng (Leng,
2005) and more recently by Christopher Daly and Simon Langford (Daly & Langford,
2009).
13Because the singular term “Santa” cannot be grounded ontologically.
14Or the fiction of mathematics.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 5. ABSTRACT OBJECTS: AREALISM AND ANTI-REALISM 90
That is to say, the criterion for selection as to what currently makes up the
story of mathematics cannot result in a changing set of rules or logics such
that the story of mathematics could change over time.
Instead, non-formalistic fictionalism proposes that the story of mathematics
should be evaluated by considering how mathematical sentences would be eval-
uated if their singular terms were to exist in reality. This can be illustrated
by asking the questions, if it were the case that abstract objects were to ex-
ist, would it be literally true to say “2 + 2 = 4”? Or would it be literally
true to say “2 + 2 = 5”? The fictionalist would then construe the answer to
this question as being true as a part of the mathematical story — or as being
fictionally true (Balaguer, 2015).
In doing this, the fictionalist affirms that numbers are no longer indispensable
and as such the platonist’s claim that natural scientific theories cannot survive
without mathematics is negated.
5.3.2 Figuralism
The anti-realist position called figuralism, championed by Stephen Yablo (Yablo,
2000), seeks to affirm that sentences containing abstract objects can be true
without being ontologically committed to the existence of abstract objects.
Yablo does this by affirming that discourse regarding putative abstract ob-
jects should be considered to be metaphorical rather than literal. Discourse
of this nature should be viewed as being figurative, hence the term figuralism
(Craig, 2016, p. 211).
Figuralism suggests that we ought to treat abstract objects in the same way we
treat figurative language like hyperbole, understatements or metaphors. When
a person states “it’s raining cats and dogs” that person is not committed
to animals falling from the sky - indeed the Singular Term argument only
commits a speaker to grounding singular terms in literally true simple sentences
(Balaguer, 2016).
While statement “it’s raining cats and dogs” is literally false, it does not fail to
convey truth. Yablo affirms that in this context, figurative language contains
what he calls real content which is true. It is in this way that we ought
to consider figures of speech and discourse regarding abstract objects to be
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similar (Craig, 2016, p. 211-212). That is to say, discourse regarding abstract
objects ought to be considered true based on the real content those sentences
communicate.
With respect to mathematical statements, Yablo contends that their real con-
tent is the logical truth that those sentences convey. For example, on Yablo’s
view the real content of the mathematical sentence “2 + 3 = 5” is the logical
truth:
[∃2x(Fx)&∃3y(Gy)&¬∃z(Fz&Gz)]→ ∃5u(Fu ∨Gu)
which employs numerical quantifiers. Yablo’s view is not that numbers ought
to be done away with. Rather, numbers should be treated as and or considered
to be tools for representing the real content of mathematics (Craig, 2012,
p. 444-445).
Consider another example. The sentence “the number of Martian moons is
2” may appear to make a claim regarding an actual object known as “2”.
On Yablo’s figuralist view, the real content of this sentence is there are two
Martian moons — a statement which says nothing about the number 2 or any
other abstract objects at all (Balaguer, 2015).
Thus, the figuralist affirms that discourse surrounding abstract objects should
be treated in the same way that figurative language is: discourse of this nature
should not be take to be literally true or ontologically committing, but the
truth of these sentences must be recognised to be found in their real content.
John Burgess and Gideon Rosen object to figuralism, contending that math-
ematics being figurative rather than literal is unlikely, making this point when
they say:
Certainly in all clear cases of figurative language — and it is worth
stressing that the boundary between figurative and literal is as
fuzzy as can be — the non-literal character of the linguistic per-
formance will be perfectly obvious as soon as the speaker is forced
to turn attention to the question of whether the remark was meant
literally.
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We further submit that mathematical discourse fails this test for
non-literalness (Burgess & Rosen, 2005, p. 553).
Here, Burgess and Rosen are making the point that when a person makes
use of figurative language, such as when one says “there are butterflies in my
stomach”, that person is clearly employing figurative language15 (Burgess &
Rosen, 2005, p. 532).
Burgess and Rosen claim that it is not clear, however, that when a person
makes a statement like “the number of cats in my garden is two” they are
saying “there is a cat and then there is another cat in my garden”, and that
they wouldn’t answer in the affirmative to the question “is it true that the
number of cats in your garden is prime?” (Rosen & Burgess, 2005, p. 531-
532).
We can reformulate Burgess and Rosen’s objection as such: When a person
makes use of figurative language in the commonly understood sense of the
word – such as when a person says “there are butterflies in my stomach” or
something of that nature – it is clear that they have spoken figuratively. This
clarity is not readily apparent when we consider language concerned with ab-
stract objects in general, such as when a person makes a statement containing
a number.
Craig points out that the objection raised by Burgess and Rosen merely shows
that mathematical discourse is not a clear case of either literal or figurative
language. To extrapolate from this objection that mathematical discourse
cannot be treated as figurative would be to take the objection too far (Craig,
2016, p. 214).
The anti-realist presents figuralism as a reasonable way for understanding dis-
course regarding abstract objects. Unlike fictionalism, figuralism considers
sentences like “2 + 2 = 4” to be true without requiring the singular terms “2
+ 2” or “4” to exist, relieving the burden of ontological commitment necessit-
ated by platonism when dealing with true sentences (Craig, 2016, p. 215-216).
15 That is to say, Burgess and Rosen claim that when a person makes use of figurative
language, there is no doubt that they have done so.
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5.3.3 Free Logic
In 1960, Karel Lambert abbreviated “logic free of existence assumptions with
respect to its terms, singular and general, but whose quantifiers are treated
exactly as in standard quantifier logic” to “free logic”, thereby coining the term
(Lambert, 2001, p. 258). Free logic is a position which interprets existential
quantifiers in the same way that the platonist would, but affirms that singular
terms may either fail to denote or may denote an object which exist outside
of the domain of existing things (Nolt, 2014).
More simply put, the free logician proposes a view which does away with
existence assumptions with regards to singular and general terms. On this
view, singular or general terms need not refer at all, thereby reducing the
ontological burden found in classical predicate logic (Nolt, 2014).
In classical logic, singular terms must denote things which exist. This, however,
causes a problem when singular terms in sentences either refer to things which
do not exist or are unknown. Singular terms like “the greatest integer”, “the
hole in my shirt” or “Aphrodite” do not exist and as a result, classical logic is
unreliable when it comes to speaking of these things (Nolt, 2014).
This is because classical logic makes the assumption that the singular terms
in simple sentences exist in asserting that a true sentence is about something.
On classical logic, a statement like “b does not exist” can never be true if the
object referred to by b does not exist (Reicher, 2015).
John Nolt provides an example of classical logic’s limitations with the true
sentence “We detect no motion of the earth relative to the ether” (Nolt, 2014).
Here, the singular term “the ether” denotes the light-bearing medium theor-
ised by 19th century physicists. This sentence is true because we now know
that the ether does not exist. On classical logic, however, this sentence must
be considered false because the singular terms in true sentences must exist,
therefore “the ether” is implied to exist — something which we now know
does not exist (Nolt, 2014).
Classical logic then creates a self-contradiction where the above sentence is
true, but must be considered false due to the constraints of classical logic’s
ontological commitment. On free logic, however, statements like this pose
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no problem as non-referring singular terms, such as “the ether” in the above
example, are able to exist in true sentences (Nolt, 2014).
Free logic even goes as far as to allow statements stipulating non-existence to
be considered true, expressing these in first order logic as:
∼ ∃x x = t
which, in the context of this example, would be read as “the ether does not
exist” (Nolt, 2014). Classical logic provides no such provision, and as a result
makes discourse regarding non-existent objects self-contradictory (Nolt, 2014).
Furthermore, in an attempt to limit existential commitment, the free logician
seeks to modify the principle of Existential Generalisation16 from its current
iteration:
Fa→ ∃x(Fx) (Craig, 2012, p. 446).
to read as follows:
∃x(x = t)→ [Pt→ ∃x(Px)] (Craig, 2012, p. 446).
The free logician does this so that when a scientific theory makes reference to
singular terms, ontological commitment with respect to those terms does not
follow17 (Craig, 2012, p. 446).
16 In classical logic the principle of Existential Generalisation can be read as “if a is F
there is something which is F” (Reicher, 2015). Existential generalisation is the principle
which allows one, on classical logic, to make logical deductions from statements. This can
be demonstrated as: “Pegasus is a flying horse. Pegasus exists. Therefore, flying horses
exist” (Reicher, 2015).
17The principle of Universal Instantiation allows one to make similar logical deductions to
the ones which the principle of Existential Generalisation allows, but from the standpoint
of a universal (Nolt, 2014). For example, “All dogs are mammals. Fido is a dog. Therefore,
Fido is a mammal.” On Free logic, the principle of Universal Instantiation now changes
from: ∀xA(x) =⇒ A(a/x) to: ∀y(∀x(Px)→ Py) (Craig, 2012, p.446-447)
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For the anti-realist, free logic provides a way to think about singular terms
making reference to abstract objects without being committed to the exist-
ence of those singular terms, but fails to solve the problem of existential quan-
tification. For example, the statement “there are prime numbers greater than
100” still commits the free logician to the existence of numbers (Craig, 2012,
p. 445).
While free logic may not solve the problem of ontological commitment in its
entirety, it certainly shows that classical logic is flawed when dealing with a
number of statements containing singular terms. As a result, it is not unreas-
onable for the Molinist to be reluctant to accept classical logic’s singular term
ontological commitments.
5.3.4 Meinongianism, Neo-Meinongianism and Neutral
Logic
Neo-Meinongianism is the more recently developed iteration of a view initially
promulgated in 1904 by the Austrian philosopher and psychologist, Alexius
Meinong (Meinong, 1960) whose view takes issue with the way the platonist
interprets existential quantification.
Meinong held that there are some objects which do not exist but have being.
That is to say, in addition to affirming that some objects exist, Meinong’s
view holds that some objects which do not exist have properties in a similar
way to the way existing objects have properties (van Inwagen, 2008, p. 38-
39). Examples of these non-existent objects would be Sherlock Holmes, the
fountain of youth or Vulcan (Reicher, 2015).
On Meinong’s view, a non-existent object like Sherlock Holmes has being and
as such a number of properties are attached to Sherlock Holmes such that we
can meaningfully and truthfully speak about Sherlock Holmes – saying perhaps
that Holmes smokes a pipe, or that Holmes speaks English.
Meinong’s view entails two different types of being for objects. He held that
concrete objects which have being exist, while abstract objects which have
being subsist. Both concrete and abstract objects which lack being neither
exist nor subsist (van Inwagen, 2008, p. 38-39).
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Consider this example: my cat, Eva, is a concrete object which has being and
as such exists. The Cheshire Cat is an abstract object which has being, and
therefore subsists. As an abstract object which subsists, the Cheshire Cat has
a number of properties. For example, the Cheshire Cat has the property of
being able to speak (van Inwagen, 2008, p. 38-39).
Meinong’s view was motivated by his concerns regarding intentional states
which are directed at non-existent entities. The principle of intentionality
affirms that mental phenomena are directed towards objects. On this view,
intentional acts are always about something, such as when a person thinks
about something. However, it is possible for people to think about things
which do not exist. For example, one could think about Sherlock Holmes or
the Cheshire Cat (Reicher, 2015).
On classical logic, to think about things which do not exist is problematic18
(Nolt, 2014) and as a result a number of philosophers rejected intentionality.
Meinong’s proposed solution was to say that there is an object for every mental
state, even if that object does not exist — a view which allowed Meinong to
continue to refer to objects by means of singular terms19 (Reicher, 2015).
This led Meinong to affirm that “there are objects of which it is true that there
are no such objects” (Meinong, 1960, p. 83).
Naturally it would seem to be a self contradiction to affirm that a non-existent
object exists. However, this conclusion is based on the understanding promul-
gated by classical logic that existential quantification is a means by which one
makes ontological commitment. On this view, by quantifying over a range of
objects, we are committed to those objects existing if the statement is to be
considered true (Balaguer, 2015).
18For example, on classical logic, if b does not exist, then the proposition “b does not exist”
can never be true (Reicher, 2015).
19For example, on classical logic to affirm that “Sherlock Holmes wears a hat” is problematic
because the singular term “Sherlock Holmes” fails to refer to a real entity. On Meinong’s
view, the singular term “Sherlock Holmes” does in fact refer to an entity, but one which
subsists. Meinong believed that by continuing to make reference, he had solved the problem
which classical logic struggled with (Reicher, 2015).
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Meinong rejected this view, instead taking it to be true that quantification
is ontologically neutral and as such is not existentially committing (Bricker,
2014). Thus, in quantifying over a range of objects, Meinong believed his
statement could be true without requiring the objects quantified over to exist20.
As a result of this neutral stance with regards to existential quantification,
Meinong believed one could speak of or think of Pegasus the flying horse, for
example, without being committed to flying horses existing.
A number of problem exist with Meinong’s view of non-existent objects. Meinong
affirmed an object theory which can be formulated as “so-being is independent
from existence” (Reicher, 2015).
The term “so-being” can be thought of as an object’s properties apart from
that object’s existence or non-existence (Reicher, 2015). On this view, provided
an object has being, irrespective of whether that object exists or subsists, that
object may have properties. Meinong used this theory of objects to affirm
the subsistence of a golden mountain and a round square, claiming that these
objects literally have being. Meinong came to affirm this because he believed
that every property, and every set of properties, had an object which corres-
ponds with that property or those properties – whether that object exists or
subsists (Reicher, 2015).
As a prominent critic of Meinong, Bertrand Russell (Russell, 1994a,b) pointed
out two major flaws with Meinong’s theory of objects. The first of which was
to say that some sets of propositions would be contradictions of one another
and as such it would be impossible for objects to have all the properties in that
set at once. For example, an object which is both round and square would be
an internally incongruent object (Reicher, 2015).
The second objection can be stated as follows: If all properties will exist with
every other property in some set of properties, it follows that every distinct
set of properties will be attached to a minimum of one object - irrespective of
whether the corresponding object exists or subsists. An example of this would
be this set of three properties: the property of being a mountain, the property
20On Meinong’s view, speaking of Sherlock Holmes was simply to speak of an object which
does not exist, but rather has being and subsists.
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of being golden and the property of being existent (Reicher, 2015). If this is
the case, it follows that an object which is a golden mountain exists. Clearly
this is not true, and as a result a contradiction can be found in Meinong’s
theory of objects21 (Reicher, 2015).
As a developed version of Meinong’s view, neo-Meinongianism is the anti-
realist position promulgated by Richard Routley (Routley, 1979) which holds
that singular terms in true sentences can make reference to objects which do
not exist (Craig, 2015, p. 275-276).
Routley, being an anti-realist, takes it to be true that abstract objects do not
exist and as such they have no being and do not subsist. In this regard, Routley
disagrees with Meinong. On Routley’s view, discourse regarding abstract ob-
jects is to be formalised by neutral quantification logic (Routley, 1979, p. 45),
so as to adopt a neutral position on existential quantification (Craig, 2012,
p. 446-447).
Routley’s motivation for this position is that, on classical logic, the object
being referred to by singular terms in a sentence must exist in reality in order
for that sentence to be both about something and true (Balaguer, 2015) –
something which Routley wished to avoid.
More specifically, Routley faults the traditional formulation of the principle of
Existential Generalisation (Craig, 2012, p. 446-447):
Fa→ ∃x(Fx) (Craig, 2012, p. 446)
which can be read as “if a is F there is something which is F ” (Reicher,
2015). Roultey takes this principle to be “existentially loaded”22 (Routley,
1979, p. 76), and as such seeks to remove this assumption of existence by
replacing the principle of Existential Generalisation with the principle of par-
ticularisation, formulated as such (Craig, 2012, p. 446-447):
21The line of thought behind this example would extend to a seemingly infinite number of
other objects which could never exist.
22That is to say, Routley takes it to be the case that the principle of Existential General-
isation presupposes the existence of singular terms.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 5. ABSTRACT OBJECTS: AREALISM AND ANTI-REALISM 99
Fa→ (Px)Fx (Craig, 2012, p. 447).
which can be read as “for some item, Fx”. Here, the existential quantifier
has been replaced by a quantifier of particularisation P, which can be read as
“for some item” thereby allowing Routley to speak of particular items without
denoting those items as existing. Routley then requires the principle of Ex-
istential Generalisation to be formulated using an existence predicate E, so it
would appear as such (Craig, 2012, p. 446-447):
Fa&Ea→ (∃x)Fx (Craig, 2012, p. 446)
so that one could continue to make use of the principle of Existential General-
isation, but only when existence is specifically stipulated rather than assumed.
Routley appeals to neutral logic, but neutral logic is a view which exists
autonomously and does not rely on Meinongianism or neo-Meinongianism in
any way (Craig, 2012, p. 447). Proponents of neutral logic, such as Jody
Azzouni (Azzouni, 2004) and Graham Priest (Priest, 2005) object to classical
logic’s view of quantification by interpreting it to be ontologically neutral.
Azzouni and Priest hold that quantification is simply a device by which we
make logical inference, or mark a domain of objects to which we will speak.
As a result, one can distinguish between “quantifier commitment” and “onto-
logical commitment”, where “quantifier commitment” does nothing more than
quantify over a range of objects23 (Reicher, 2015).
On this view, singular terms continue to refer to objects, but the domain to
which that object belongs does not need to specify that the objects found in
that domain must exist. One could, for example, quantify over an imaginary
realm of objects which, by their definition, do not exist. Objects within this
realm could be referred to truthfully, but no existential commitment would
follow (Craig, 2012, p. 447).
23Azzouni and Priest take it to be the case that one could quantify over a range of objects
and either commit to grounding those objects ontologically or not ground those objects
ontologically. They disagree that by quantifying, ontological commitment must follow
(Reicher, 2015).
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Neutral logicians like Azzouni affirm that domains of quantification include
metalanguage by which we can come to know where the domain of quantifica-
tion in question necessitates ontological commitment or is simply committing
to quantification. Thus, one could quantify over objects and in doing so, spe-
cify whether the object being quantified over must exist or not (Craig, 2012,
p. 447).
Neutral logic differs from neo-Meinongianism in that it does not require the
principle of Existential Generalisation to be reformulated as Routley proposes,
but rather suggests that any domain of quantification could or could not be
committed to locating its objects in reality (Craig, 2012, p. 447).
By appealing to aspects of neutral logic, the neo-Meinongian can affirm that
the sentence “Some objects do not exist” merely quantifies over a range of
objects, rather than both quantifying over and committing to the existence of
that range of objects or indeed any number of the objects within that range24.
Unlike the free logician, neo-Meinongians believe that singular terms do in fact
refer – but that these references can be made to non-existent objects. Similarly
to the free logician however, and unlike the fictionalist, the neo-Meinongian
affirms that sentences containing singular terms which make reference to non-
existing objects can be true (Balaguer, 2015).
The neo-Meinongian, then, claims that singular terms do refer, but that the
objects referred to may or may not exist. In doing this, the neo-Meinongian
is open to true discourse regarding all objects, irrespective of whether those
objects exist or not. Therefore, in subscribing to the neo-Meinongian view, the
anti-realist is able to make statements like “There is a number 4” without being
committed to any numbers being located in reality (Craig, 2012, p. 446-447).
Neo-Meinongianism has been criticised by both Mark Balaguer (Balaguer,
2015) and Peter van Inwagwen (van Inwagen, 2004, p. 128-129) for the way
it uses the term exist. Where van Inwagen claims that the neo-Meinongian
simply uses the term ambiguously, Balaguer affirms that neo-Meinongianism
does not help the anti-realist avoid platonism in any way.
24 In this instance, the objects being quantified over would simply be a set which are non-
existent.
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Suppose we were to affirm that we can see the term true as existing in two
different forms: true1 and true2. On true1, an object must be referred to
in order for the sentence of the form Fa to be taken as true25. On true2, a
sentence of the form Fa can be true even if the singular term does not refer to
an existing object (Balaguer, 2015).
We can then say that true1 is true in the platonic sense
26 while true2 is true
in a neo-Meinongian sense27 (Balaguer, 2015).
If all of this were the case, Balaguer claims that the platonist could easily
respond by saying that they are not worried whether the normal use case
of the word true28 is used to mean true1 or true2 because the Singular Term
argument is meant to communicate the truth of true1, particularly with respect
to mathematics. Thus, discussion surrounding how to understand the word
true is mostly irrelevant. Rather, what is relevant is if the platonist has good
reason to affirm the truth1 of mathematics
29 – and indeed whether the anti-
realist has good reason to object to this view (Balaguer, 2015).
Balaguer’s argument affirms that, given that the neo-Meinongian claims that
sentences like “3 is prime” are both true and make reference to abstract ob-
jects, the neo-Meinongian does nothing to defeat the argument put forth by
platonism30 (Balaguer, 2015).
25That is to say, a must refer to an object located in reality in order for a simple sentence
to be both true and about something.
26 That is, the way a platonist would categorise ontological commitment in order for a
sentence to be true.
27That is, the way a neo-Meinongian would categorise ontological commitment in order for
a sentence to be true.
28By this I mean, the way in which the word true is used in ordinary English.
29That is, affirm the truth of mathematical statements in the true1 sense.
30 That is to say, the platonist affirms that simple sentences are about abstract objects,
and that these abstract objects must exist in order for the sentence to be true, in the
true1 sense. The neo-Meinongian affirms that simple sentences are about abstract objects,
but because these abstract objects do not exist, the sentence is true in the true2 sense.
Balaguer’s claim is that quarrelling over how to understand true is not particularly useful
because the platonist could easily affirm that they understand the term true in the true1
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Alternatively, the anti-realist31 could easily concur with the neutral logician
by affirming that there is no need for all quantification to be existentially
compelling. By doing this, they would continue to use singular terms to refer
to objects which belong to a domain, but would not be required to stipulate
that the domain of objects quantified over be located in reality. One could
quantify over objects like numbers, for example, and speak specifically about
the number 2 without being committed to that object existing — thus negating
the view that mathematics is indispensable for our theories of natural science.
5.4 Conclusion
While arealism appears to be a closed option to both theists and Molinists,
anti-realist options are most certainly open to the Molinist. Furthermore, a
number of these options have demonstrated deficiencies in the classical logic
which the platonist draws on. While none of the positions have been shown to
be preferable, they have provided different ways to think of abstract objects
such that a realist position appears unnecessary in order to affirm the truth
or validity of scientific theories.
The Molinist would be justified in siding with any number of the positions
which find fault with the platonist’s Singular Term argument. In doing so, the
Molinist is able to avoid affirming the existence of abstract objects.
sense, and their argument is structured as such. Thus, the neo-Meinongian isn’t actually
defeating the platonist position. (Balaguer, 2015).
31That is, any person seeking to affirm anti-realism by concurring with the neutral logician,
by affirming the neo-Meinongian view or any of the other anti-realist views.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Introduction
In this concluding chapter, the train of thought of this work is outlined. The
primary research question is broken down, with the secondary, subsequent
questions being highlighted. This is done in an attempt to show how this
work developed and grew in the manner in which it did. A final conclusion is
reached before future research opportunities are assessed.
6.2 Train of Thought: What is Molinism?
The primary research question for this work is “How can the Molinist pre-
serve God’s aseity while affirming God’s middle knowledge?” To answer this
question, the following questions first needed to be answered:
(1) What is Molinism?
(2) What does the Molinist think God’s aseity is?
(3) Why would there be a problem between affirming divine aseity
and middle knowledge?
In response to (1), we can say that Molinism is the solution to the conundrum
of divine providence and human free will promulgated by Luis de Molina (Per-
szyk, 2013, p. 755-756). This raises two further questions:
103
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(1.1) What does the Molinist take divine providence to be?
(1.2) What does the Molinist take human free will to be?
In answering (1.1), we can say that the Molinist understands divine provid-
ence to be the natural outworking of God’s omniscience, omnipotence and
omnibenevolence (Flint, 1998, p. 12). On this view, God’s omniscience can
be understood as God’s complete knowledge of our universe – God knows all
things about our world including its history, present state and future.
God’s omnipotence is taken to be God’s power to rule over this world such
that all things which happen are as a result of God’s specific and complete
control. God’s omnibenevolence is taken to be God’s moral perfection and
goodness (Flint, 1998, p. 12).
As such, in thinking of divine providence we can think of it as being God’s
perfect knowledge of and control over all things which happen in the world,
with both of these characteristics being guided by God’s good and morally
perfect nature.
In answering (1.2), we can say that the Molinist affirms libertarian free will –
the thesis that “freedom is incompatible with (causal) determinism, plus the
claim that at least some number of our actions are free” (Perszyk, 2013, p. 755).
In expanding this view, we can say that the Molinist affirms both that “Some
human actions are free” and that “It is not possible that a free human action
be ultimately causally determined by events not under the causal control of
its agent” (Flint, 1998, p.22-24).
In doing so, the Molinist is committed to locating the cause of any free agent’s
free act within the free agent in question (Flint, 1998, p. 23). This should
not be extrapolated to mean that all actions committed by any free agent find
their cause in the free agent in question, just that the free actions of any free
agent do.
Examining the answers to (1.1) and (1.2) might lead one to conclude that the
two are incompatible: God cannot be completely in control of all things while
allowing free agents to make free decisions. Either agents don’t determine their
actions – and are therefore not free – or God does not have full providence
over our world. This may lead us to ask a further question:
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(1.3) How can the Molinist account for God having divine provid-
ence whilst also affirming that free agents are free to choose between
multiple options in at least some instances?
To answer this question, the Molinst postulates God’s middle knowledge.
God’s middle knowledge is said to exist between God’s natural knowledge
and God’s free knowledge. God’s natural knowledge is taken to be God’s
knowledge of all necessary truths and can be found prior to God’s free act
of creation (Campbell, 2006, p. 2-3). Additionally, through God’s natural
knowledge, God is able to comprehend all possibilities (Flint, 1998, p. 37).
God’s free knowledge is taken to be the knowledge which God determines to be
true based on God’s decision to freely create (Flint, 1998, p. 38). God’s middle
knowledge exists between God’s natural knowledge and God’s free knowledge,
prior to God’s free act of creation and is made up of contingent prevolitional
subjunctive conditional which are not under God’s control (Flint, 1998, p. 38-
40).
Through God’s middle knowledge, God knows how any free creature would
choose were that creature to be put in a specific set of circumstances at a
specific time such that they were free with respect to making a specific decision
(Perszyk, 2013, p.755). At the same time, God having this knowledge does
nothing to detract from the fact that the cause of any free action taken by
a free agent continues to find its cause within the agent in question, thereby
preserving the freedom of free agents (Flint, 1998, p.40).
The Molinist’s solution can be formulated as such: God knows everything
which is necessary and everything which is possible through God’s natural
knowledge. God knows how any free agent would choose were they to find
themselves free with respect to a decision in any given set of circumstances.
In combining natural and middle knowledge, God has the knowledge required
to be able to bring about a world in which free agents freely make decisions
whilst at the same time all of the circumstances which obtain do so as a result
of God’s specific will (Perszyk, 2013, p. 755-756). As a result of this God
is perfectly in control of every aspect of the world which obtains, whilst still
affording free creatures libertarian free will.
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6.3 Train of Thought: Aseity and an
Objection
To answer the primary research question “How can the Molinist preserve God’s
aseity while affirming God’s middle knowledge?” we now have the following
set of questions:
(1) What is Molinism?
(1.1) What does the Molinist take divine providence to be?
(1.2) What does the Molinist take human free will to be?
(1.3) How can the Molinist account for God having divine provid-
ence whilst also affirming that free agents are free to choose between
multiple options in at least some instances?
(2) What does the Molinist think God’s aseity is?
(3) Why would there be a problem between affirming divine aseity
and middle knowledge?
The task of answering (1) and subsequent questions is relatively straight for-
ward on account of God’s attributes, as well as God’s knowledge, being directly
related to Molinism and the claims which the Molinist makes. Answering (2)
poses a slightly different challenge because Molinism does not make any direct
claims regarding God’s aseity.
Having said that, Molinism aligns itself quite closely with classical theism
(Flint, 1998, p. 4-5) and as a result, classical theism’s take on God’s aseity can
be taken as the default position on the matter for the Molinist. Furthermore,
many Molinists in recent history have either defended or made use of the
Ontological Argument for God’s existence, providing a further foundation for
thinking about God’s nature (Plantinga, 1974b).
In affirming the Ontological Argument for God’s existence, the Molinist affirms
that God is maximally great in all possible ways whilst affirming that God
exists by the necessity of God’s nature (Craig, 2008, p. 184-185). The classical
theist would typically concur with this position, often going further in asserting
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that God is self-sufficient and exists independently of all creation (Grudem,
2000, p. 161).
Thus, with respect to God’s aseity the Molinist can be thought of as affirming
that God is the maximally great being, that God exists by the necessity of
God’s nature, that God exists independently and that God is self-sufficient.
To answer (3), consider the following: God’s middle knowledge is made up of
knowledge of how free creatures would act if they were placed in a specific set
of circumstances. God would not determine this knowledge – the free creatures
would (Flint, 1998, p. 22-24). Is it not possible that this creates a scenario
where God relies on something outside of the triune Godhead, thus making
God something other than independent, or wholly self-existent? There are two
responses to this objection.
First, Thomas Flint and Alfred Freddoso have argued that if it is true that
God freely chooses to create free agents, those agents determining their own
actions is a logical limitation (Flint & Freddoso, 1983, p. 93-98). If this is true,
then God’s capacity being limited in this respect is akin to God’s omnipotence
being limited due to God being incapable of being able to create similarly
illogical entities like a square circle (Flint & Freddoso, 1983, p. 95).
Second, God’s middle knowledge exists prior to the divine decree. When God
creates, free agents begin to exist and those agents can then take free action
when they find themselves in specific circumstances and free with respect to
certain decisions. Prior to the divine decree, those agents do not exist. As
such, knowledge of how those agents would choose must take the form of
propositional truths.
On this view, if abstract objects like propositions really do exist, then it would
be the case that God would be required to look outside of the triune Godhead
to complete God’s middle knowledge. If, however, these abstract objects either
exist as entities which are dependent on God, or if they do not exist at all,
then we can say that God continues to not rely on anything apart from the
triune Godhead.
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6.4 Train of Thought: Abstract Objects
A new set of questions must now be asked about abstract objects:
(4) Which options are open for the Molinist with respect to abstract
objects?
(4.1) What is an abstract object?
(4.2) What are the approaches to abstract objects?
Answering (4.1) is relatively easy – objects can be broken into two classes,
either abstract or concrete. Abstract objects are objects which are causally
impotent and would include objects such as possible worlds, propositions, sets,
numbers, shapes and so on (Gould, 2011a, p. 255-256). A further question can
be asked regarding specific abstract objects which are pertinent to Molinism:
‘(4.1.1) What does the Molinist take a possible world to be?’
The Molinist takes a possible world to be a set of states of affairs which max-
imally describes the way reality is or might be (Craig, 2008, p. 183). Our
world is one of many possible worlds, with each set of circumstances being de-
scribed by a state of affairs (Plantinga, 1974a, p. 34-35). Through God’s nat-
ural knowledge, God comprehends all possibilities – including possible worlds
(Campbell, 2006, p. 2). Through God’s middle knowledge, God knows how
free creatures will act when placed in any specific set of non-determining cir-
cumstances (Flint, 1998, p. 40). As a result of this, God knows what will
ultimately happen if God chooses to actualise any possible world.
To answer (4.2) is similarly easy: three broad approaches exist with respect
to abstract objects: Arealism, realism and anti-realism (Craig, 2016, p. 203-
206). Arealism can be taken to be the view that a fact of the matter regarding
the existence of abstract objects simply does not exist (Craig, 2015, p. 274-
275). Realism is the view that abstract objects actually exist (Craig, 2016,
p. 203-206). Anti-realism is the view that abstract objects simply do not exist
(Gould, 2011a, p. 271).
Three further questions must now be asked regarding abstract objects:
(4.2.1) Is arealism open to the Molinist?
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(4.2.2) Is realism open to the Molinist?
(4.2.3) Is anti-realism open to the Molinist?
Arealism, addressed in (4.2.1) is a position which appears to be closed to the
Molinist. If all reality apart from God exists as created by God, then a fact
of the matter regarding the existence of abstract objects must exist: either
abstract objects exist created by God or they do not (Craig, 2016, p. 206-207).
The questions asked in (4.2.2) and (4.2.3) are more challenging to answer. On
realism, a number of views exist, of which the platonist view is the most threat-
ening to God’s aseity (Craig, 2016, p. 206). Platonism affirms that abstract
objects exist as uncreated, mind-independent entities (Craig, 2016, p. 201).
Thus, on this view, possible worlds, propositions numbers and other abstract
objects actually exist alongside God as uncreated and distinct entities (Craig,
2012, p. 442-443). With God’s middle knowledge existing in propositional
form, on platonism, God would have to look beyond the triune Godhead to
complete God’s middle knowledge.
Platonism argues that its view of abstract objects is necessary if we are to take
our best scientific theories as being true, abstract objects must literally exist
(Craig, 2012, p. 442-443). Platonism promulgates the Singular Term argument
to this end, claiming that singular terms in simple sentences must be grounded
in reality if those sentences are to be taken as being literally true and about
something (Balaguer, 2016).
6.5 Train of Thought: Theism With the
Singular Term Argument
The Singular Term argument does nothing to show that abstract objects must
exist uncreated – just that they must exist. As such, one could be convinced
of the truth of the Singular Term argument and adhere to a realist view which
sees abstract objects as existing and dependent on God in some way.
Absolute creationism is the view promulgated by Thomas Morris and Chris-
topher Menzel (Morris & Menzel, 1986, p. 353-362) which affirms that abstract
objects exist as created by God. This view has a problem in that it falls prey to
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the bootstrapping objection (Gould, 2011a, p. 268-269). This objection points
out that if God has the property of being powerful, for example, then God
must have made that property. But if God made that property, God must
have already had the property of being powerful in order to have made the
property – a vicious circle. This view suffers from a further objection specific
to Molinism: If God’s middle knowledge exists logically prior to the divine
decree, how is it possible that God could have made abstract objects?
A second realist view is called divine conceptualism. Greg Welty (Welty, 2006)
is a recent proponent of this view who sees abstract objects as existing in the
mind of God as God’s thoughts in some way (Welty, 2004, p. 55-57). On this
view, abstract objects do not exist necessarily, nor do they exist distinct from
God (Gould, 2011a, p. 270). On this view, abstract objects exist as thoughts in
God’s mind to which we can analyse or make reference to in some way (Craig,
2016, p. 208-209). Concerns exist regarding this view, such as “Why would
God hold trivial or banal thoughts in conscious thought at all times so that
we can make reference to them?” (Craig, 2016, p. 208-209) or “How would
God come to know necessarily false propositions if the Molinist believes that
all of God’s knowledge is made up of necessarily true things or contingently
true things?”
Furthermore, viewing Welty’s divine conceptualism as a realist view does seem
problematic on account of the fact that the nerve between divine conceptualism
and realism seems to have been severed if abstract objects exist exclusively in
the mind of God in a non-real way (Craig, 2016, p. 209). None of this serves
to make divine conceptualism untenable for the Molinist, though it does mean
that further investigation must be conducted.
To answer (4.2.2) completely, we must first look to answer (4.2.3).
6.6 Train of Thought: Theism Without the
Singular Term Argument
If one is not convinced by the Singular Term argument, a large number of
anti-realist positions exist all of which looking to detract from or undercut one
or more of the Singular Term arguments premises:
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Fictionalism: This view claims that abstract objects do not exist, therefore
simple sentences making use of singular terms which make reference to abstract
objects cannot be literally true. The fictionalist affirms that these sentences
can, however, be fictionally true. Thus, the sentence “2 + 2 = 4” would be
fictionally true, based on the story of mathematics (Balaguer, 2014, p. 8). On
fictionalism, mathematics in scientific theories can be thought of as a useful
fiction, thereby preserving the scientific theory by affirming it continues to give
us an accurate description of reality (Balaguer, 2015).
Figuralism: This view argues that discourse surrounding abstract objects can
be thought of as being true by treating it in the same way figures of speech are
treated (Craig, 2016, p. 211). Stephen Yablo contends that figures of speech
contain real content, so that when a person says “I have butterflies in my
stomach” that person is not committed to actual butterflies existing in their
stomach, yet they have still communicated truth regarding their current state
(Craig, 2012, p. 444-445). Figuralism argues that in treating all discourse
surrounding abstract objects in this way, abstract objects do not need to exist
but their real content can continue to convey meaningful truth.
Free Logic: Coined by Karel Lambert, free logic claims that singular terms in
simple sentences need not make reference at all – thereby removing the neces-
sity for those objects to exist in reality in order for the sentence to be true
(Lambert, 2001, p. 258). John Nolt points out that classical logic struggles
to make sense of sentences which contain singular terms making reference to
objects which do not exist, such as “the hole in my shirt” or the non-existent
“ether” which 19th century physicists theorised (Nolt, 2014). Free logicians
propose that the principles of Existential Generalisation and Universal Instan-
tiation be reformulated to restrict ontological commitment with respect to
singular terms, thereby allowing scientific theories to make use of numbers, for
example, without commitment to those entities following (Craig, 2012, p. 446-
446).
Meinongianism and Neo-Meinongianism: Richard Routley’s neo-Meinongianism
(Routley, 1979) is an anti-realist view which exists as a developed version of
Alexius Meinong’s view. On neo-Meinongianism, singular terms in simple sen-
tences can make reference to objects which do not exist (Craig, 2015, p. 275-
276). Like the free logician, Routley faults the principle of Existential Gener-
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alisation, taking it to be “existentially loaded” (Routley, 1979, p. 76). Routley
held that this assumption of existence ought to be removed and proposed do-
ing so by reformulating the principle of Existential Generalisation so that only
particular items denoted by an existence predicate would be required to exist
(Craig, 2012, p. 446-447).
Neutral Logic: Logicians who affirm neutral logic take it to be the case that
quantification does not imply existence (Reicher, 2015). In classical logic,
in quantifying over a range of objects, the existence of those objects is re-
quired if sentences purporting to be about those objects are to be literally
true (Balaguer, 2016). Neutral logicians like Graham Priest (Priest, 2005)
and Jody Azzouni (Azzouni, 2004) take quantification to be simply a device
by which we logically delimit a range of objects (Reicher, 2015). From this,
no ontological commitment should follow. That is not to say that quantify-
ing cannot commit one to the objects within that range existing, just that it
does not follow necessarily (Reicher, 2015). Neutral logic stands apart from
neo-Meinongianism and does not require the reformulation of the principle of
Existential Generalisation in any way (Craig, 2012, p. 447). On neutral logic,
numbers as objects would belong to a range of objects which could simply not
exist. As such, numbers could exist in scientific theories without committing
a person to grounding numbers in reality in order for those scientific theories
to be true.
Attempting to answer (4.2.2) and (4.2.3) is now much easier: Realist views are
open to the Molinist, though viewing abstract objects as mind-independent
and uncreated is certainly not an option for the Molinist. Were the Molinist
to do so, possible worlds, propositions and other abstract objects would exist
as uncreated and apart from God from which God would have to draw in order
to complete God’s middle knowledge of contingent, prevolitional subjunctive
conditionals.
This would seem to make God something other than wholly self-existent,
thereby detracting from God’s aseity. Other realist options1 which view ab-
stract objects as existing in some way dependent upon God are certainly open
1 Namely platonic theism, absolute creationism and divine conceptualism.
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to the Molinist.
With respect to anti-realist options, a vast array exist as options for the Molin-
ist. All of these are possible options from a theological perspective2, but philo-
sophically no motivation has been provided with respect to which of these
options could be thought of as better or worse for the Molinist.
Nevertheless, classical logic’s existential assumptions have been attacked by
neo-Meinongians and neutral logicians; free logic has shown a way to think
of singular terms without requiring them to make reference to objects and
fictionalism and figuralism have shown that the real content or truth of simple
sentences which purport to be about abstract objects can be preserved without
losing the ability to describe reality accurately.
6.7 Train of Thought: Conclusion
Thus, to answer the primary research question “How can the Molinist pre-
serve God’s aseity while affirming God’s middle knowledge?” we now have the
following set of questions:
(1) What is Molinism3?
(1.1) What does the Molinist take divine providence to be4?
(1.2) What does the Molinist take human free will to be5?
(1.3) How can the Molinist account for God having divine provid-
ence whilst also affirming that free agents are free to choose between
multiple options in at least some instances6?
(2) What does the Molinist think God’s aseity is7?
2 By theological perspective, I mean a perspective based on theological concerns - that is,
concerns found in Scripture or Christian tradition.
3 See chapter 2, section 1
4 See chapter 2, section 2 called Divine Providence
5 See chapter 2, section 4 called Libertarian Freedom
6 See chapter 3, section 3 called The Molinist Solution
7 See chapter 2, section 3 called Divine Aseity
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(3) Why would there be a problem between affirming divine aseity
and middle knowledge8?
(4) Which options are open for the Molinist with respect to abstract
objects9?
(4.1) What is an abstract object10?
(4.1.1) What does the Molinist take a possible world to be11?
(4.2) What are the approaches to abstract objects12?
(4.2.1) Is arealism open to the Molinist13?
(4.2.2) Is realism open to the Molinist14?
(4.2.3) Is anti-realism open to the Molinist15?
With the answer to the primary research question, in its most simplistic form,
being “The Molinist can preserve God’s aseity while affirming God’s middle
knowledge by affirming that either abstract objects do not exist, or that they
exist created by and dependent upon God.”
The only options completely closed to the Molinist are platonism and arealism,
with other options existing as open to the Molinist – at least from a theological
perspective16.
8 See chapter 3, section 4 called Campbell’s Objection
9 See chapters 4 and 5
10See chapter 4, section 2 called Abstract Objects
11See chapter 3, section 2 called Possible Worlds
12See chapter 4, section 2 called Abstract Objects
13See chapter 5, section 2 called Arealism
14See chapter 4, sections 3-7
15See chapter 5, sections 5.3.1 - 5.3.5
16By theological perspective, I mean a perspective based on theological concerns - that is,
concerns found in Scripture or Christian tradition.
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6.8 Exit Points
A number of exit points exist along this journey. For example, if one were to
affirm that humans are not free or if one were to say that God does not have
divine foreknowledge then it would be the case that the argument outlined in
this work could be ignored. This, however, is of little interest. Human free will
and God’s foreknowledge are core tenants of Molinism (Flint, 1998, p. 22-40),
so to deny these would really be to deny fundamental aspects of Molinism.
With this work’s conclusion being relatively conservative, perhaps it would be
more fruitful to consider how one may undercut the conclusion that platonism
and arealism are not options for the Molinist. One way to do this would be
to affirm that abstract objects exist but that they cannot be created, as Peter
van Inwagen does (van Inwagen, 2009, p. 4-11).
On this view, if one were to hold that abstract objects do exist, they could not
exist as created by God, but that this is simply a logical limitation because
abstract objects are uncreatable – just like a square circle is uncreatable (van
Inwagen, 2009, p. 3). In affirming this, one would be undercutting the thesis
that the Molinist could adopt one of the realist positions which see abstract
objects as dependent upon God in some capacity, but would do nothing to
detract from the conclusion that an anti-realist approach to abstract objects
is not an option for the Molinist.
Van Inwagen readily admits that he is convinced by the Singular Term argu-
ment presented by platonists (van Inwagen, 2015b, p. 289), though it does not
logically follow to say that by assuming the position that abstract objects are
uncreatable, one is committed to abstract objects existing. Nevertheless, it
does seem to be true that by assume the position that abstract objects ex-
ist and are uncreatable, one is forced to affirm that God’s knowledge would
be made up of propositions, possible worlds and other abstract objects which
would exist distinct from the triune Godhead – thereby undercutting God’s
aseity as understood by the Molinist.
An attempt to defeat the objection raised by Travis Campbell (Campbell, 2006,
p. 16-19) whilst concurring with van Inwagen would require the reworking of
what God’s aseity is taken to be.
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What of arealism? Taken to be the view that no fact of the matter regarding
the existence of abstract objects, arealism seems to be closed to Molinists and
theists alike (Craig, 2016, p. 206). The claim that this view is closed to the
Molinist can be specified slightly further: the claim is not that we can know
whether abstract objects exist or not. Rather, this conclusion takes it that
a fact of the matter exists and is known by God. If God exists necessariliy
and in all possible worlds (Plantinga, 1976, p. 140), and God has the property
of being omniscient, whereby God knows all things about any world which is
actual (Grudem, 2000, p. 190-193), then God would know all things about all
actual worlds.
Therefore, God would know whether abstract objects exist or not, and as a
result a fact of the matter would exist (Craig, 2016, p. 206-207). If one were
to attempt to undercut this conclusion, one would either have to say that God
does not exist by the necessity of God’s own nature, or alter the way in which
God’s omniscience is understood.
Arguing in either of these ways is certainly possible, though this work has
demonstrated reason to believe that God’s aseity is thought of as existing in a
certain way by classical theists and Molinists alike, that God’s nature necessit-
ates God’s existence and that God’s free knowledge of all actual worlds must
be thought of as being unfaltering and complete. Arguing against any of these
positions could be very reasonable but this work has at least demonstrated the
rationale behind the Molinist’s position with respect to God’s free knowledge,
aseity and nature.
6.9 Further Study
This work set out to answer the question “Does a way exist for the Molinist to
affirm both God’s aseity and God’s middle knowledge”, to which the answer
is yes. Having said that, only a small number of views have been eliminated
in this work, with none of the other possible views having been proactively
argued for.
To show that any of the other views surveyed in this work can be thought of
as being better for the Molinist to adopt requires further research.
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6.10 Conclusion
While abstract in nature, the intricacies of ontological commitment are most
certainly pertinent to the Molinist if they are to preserve God’s aseity. William
Lane Craig once said that it would “be on the basis of practical applications —
the theological fruitfulness or lack thereof — that Molinism [ultimately] stands
or falls” (Craig, 1995, p. 121). The consideration as to whether God’s middle
knowledge undercuts God’s aseity is a very practical question with a very
practical answer, even if that answer concerns itself with abstract discourse17.
It is the conclusion of this work that it would be completely reasonable for
the Molinst to reject the platonist’s Singular Term argument and take an anti-
realist approach to abstract objects. Having said that, were the Molinist to be
convinced by the Singular Term argument, they could easily affirm one of the
realist views which sees abstract objects as being dependent upon or created
by God.
In adopting either of these stances, the Molinist is empowered to preserve
God’s aseity whilst affirming God’s middle knowledge.
17Adhering to a Molinist world view allows one to better understand the problem of evil -
one of the greatest challenges that Christianity faces. By ensuring that Molinism is able
to stand up to critique regarding the existence of abstract objects, the Molinist position is
strengthened thereby lending credence to a doctrine which seeks to meet the problem of
evil head on.
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